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TRANSACTIONAL SCRIPTS IN CONTRACT STACKS 
 
Shaanan Cohney* & David A. Hoffman** 
 
 
Abstract 
In conventional transactions, written contracts usually memorialize the terms 
of the commercial exchange. For deals in which some of the goods being 
transferred and the forum for the trade are digitized—as in the case of 
cryptocurrencies—parties may use computer code rather than a written contract 
to record their terms. Such pieces of code are sometimes called “smart contracts” 
because they perform many of the same functions as contracts but are expressed 
in a computing language. Coded exchanges embody a potentially revolutionary 
contracting innovation. But they are difficult to assimilate into traditional 
contracting terminology, conceptual framing, and doctrine.  
This Article begins by distilling the central legally and practically significant 
type of smart contracts—what we call “transactional scripts.” It then develops 
an account of how these scripts, which operate on public blockchains, are 
created, the economic barriers to their adoption, and how they produce errors of 
legal significance. This account, in turn, allows us to more rigorously and 
accessibly situate transactional scripts in existing legal doctrine. 
Commentators are enthusiastic about scripts in part because, the story goes, 
they are “self-executing” and require no third-party adjudicators. Yet we show 
that optimism to be unfounded by documenting how scripts, like ordinary 
contracts, can result in misunderstanding, frustrated intent, and failure.  
When code misdelivers, disappointed parties will seek legal recourse. We argue 
that jurists should situate scripts within other legally operative statements and 
disclosures, or contract stacks. Precision about the relationship between script 
and stack sustains a novel framework, rooted in old doctrines of interpretation, 
parol evidence and equity, that will help jurists compile answers to the private 
law problems that digitized exchange entails. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In early 2019, a group of people founded Edgeware, a 
blockchain-based platform designed to host software 
development.1 Edgeware made potential users a deal: if they 
agreed to temporarily sequester some cryptocurrency 
(essentially, placing an initial investment in escrow), they’d gain 
governance rights over the platform at a later date.2 The 
mechanism for that investment was a piece of carefully-audited 
software, called “Lockdrop,” which was deployed on a blockchain.3 
Lockdrop seemed to embody and constitute a novel contracting 
technology, written in a programming language (Solidity) that 
didn’t even exist a decade ago. 
By July of 2019, investors committed $300,000,000 to the 
project using Lockdrop. Then someone looked with particular care 
at the following piece of code:4  
 
assert(address(lockAddr).balance == msg.value); 
 
As it turns out, this line was susceptible to a software hack 
that would have permanently impounded investor assets.5 
Luckily, the error was discovered before it caused harm. But, as 
the coder who discovered the vulnerability put it, “smart 
contracts are software. Even carefully audited, well tested 
software will (almost always) contain bugs. Therefore, and 
despite our best efforts … Smart contracts will (almost always) 
contain bugs!”6 The question we ask in this paper is simple: can 
contract law make sense of intractable bugs in transactional 
code?  The answer is likewise simple: yes. 	
1 COMMONWEALTH LABS, EDGEWARE: AN ADAPTIVE SMART-CONTRACT BLOCKCHAIN 1 
(Draft v0.99 2019), https://arena-
attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/3850782/1928e31873075de95992d4987eb14a2e.pdf?155
2432633 (hereinafter “Edgeware Whitepaper”).	
2 See id. at 5 (“EDG entitles holders both staking and voting rights . . . . ”). For an 
introduction to cryptocurrencies, see Shaanan Cohney, David A. Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff 
& David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 603-605 (2019); 
see also DAVID FOX & SARAH GREEN, CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW 
(Oxford 2019). 
3 Certificate of Smart Contract Audit for Edge-lockdrop, QUANTSTAMP (Apr. 08, 2019), 
https://arena-
attachments.s3.amazonaws.com/4282493/a155dc84aa1dfba4cfd3dc6be1e1ebdc.pdf?15579
65252. 
4 Neil McLaren, Gridlock (A Smart Contract Bug), MEDIUM (July 1, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@nmcl/gridlock-a-smart-contract-bug-73b8310608a9. 
5 If the attacker designated cryptocurrency to the next lock address, the total balance 
would exceed the amount sent by Lockdrop, causing the check to fail. This would freeze 
the sequestering process permanently in place. 
6 McLaren, supra note 4.  
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But to their promotors, even buggy “smart contracts” like 
Lockdrop are the vanguard of a revolution, heralding an age in 
which code will depose both contract theory and practice.7 
Enthusiasts argue that when contracts are embodied and 
performed by code, contracting costs (like negotiation, 
monitoring, and performance) will fall. Better still, parties won’t 
need to trust each other, or courts, to be assured that they’ll get 
what they bargained for. The result: “smart contracts” are offered 
as a potential solution to an astounding variety of business and 
social problems. They may transform insurance,8 financial 
derivatives,9 consumer protection,10 corporate governance,11 tax 
filing,12 voting,13 supply chain management,14 bankruptcy,15 
property rights,16 and repossession through the internet of 
things.17 But there’s more. Jurisprudence—in the sense of the 
fundamental utility of contract doctrine—is on the chopping 
	
7 Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a Regulatory 
Technology: From Code Is Law to Law Is Code, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/7113/5657 (“[S]mart contracts are 
actually meant to replace legal contracts.”); Mark Verstraete, The Stakes of Smart 
Contracts, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 743, 743 (2019) (“By consensus, smart contracts are a 
revolution in private ordering.”). 
8 Smart Contracts: 10 Use Cases for Business, AMBISAFE, https://ambisafe.com/blog/smart-
contracts-10-use-cases-business/  
9 See generally INT’L. SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N., LEGAL GUIDELINES FOR SMART 
DERIVATIVES CONTRACTS: INTRODUCTION (2019), https://www.isda.org/2019/01/30/legal-
guidelines-for-smart-derivatives-contracts-introduction/. 
10 See generally Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 
71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2014). 
11 Fiammetta S. Piazza, Bitcoin and the Blockchain as Possible Corporate Governance 
Tools: Strengths and Weaknesses, 5 PA. ST. J. L. & INT’L. AFF. 262, 282-286 (2017). 
12 Valentyn Vishnevsky & Viktoria Chekina, Robot vs. Tax Inspector, or How the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution Will Change the Tax System: A Review of Problems and Solutions, 4 
J. TAX REFORM 6, 20 (2018). 
13 See Tsui S. Ng, Blockchain and Beyond: Smart Contracts, A.B.A. BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 
28,  2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2017/09/09_ng/. 
14 See generally Horst Treiblmaier, The Impact of the Blockchain on the Supply Chain: A 
Theory Based Research Framework and a Call for Action, 23 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. INT‘L. 
J. 545 (2018). 
15 See generally Alan Rosenberg, Automatic Contracts and the Automatic Stay: A Primer 
on “Smart Contracts” in Bankruptcy, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18 (2019).  
16 See, e.g., Michael Casey, Could Blockchain Technology Help the World’s Poor?, WORLD 
ECON. FORUM AGENDA (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/could-
blockchain-technology-help-the-worlds-poor. 
17 For the canonical description, see Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Comment, Smart Contracts and 
the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 263, 271-78 (2017).	
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block.18 For many, smart contracts are the first transformative 
legal innovation of the millennium.19 
Perhaps inevitably, “smart contracts,” a term that connotes 
money, computers, and modernity, has invited a stampede of 
commentators to speculate about a wide variety of possible 
contracting technologies.20 Many marvel at the innovation as 
some kind of utopian simulacra:21 a self-executing,22  irreversible,23 
transparent exchange,24 occurring through “consensus,” that is 
“self-executing”25 or “automated.”26 With that capacious definition 
in mind, is the chip in your Visa Card part of a smart contract 
network? The code comprising the Venmo App?  Your 
Metrocard?27 If we can’t understand the scope of this phenomenon, 	
18 For a lucid review, see generally Marco Dell’Erba, Demystifying Technology: Do Smart 
Contracts Require a New Legal Framework? Regulatory Fragmentation, Self-Regulation 
and Public Regulation, 5 U. PA. J. L. & PUB. AFF. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with SSRN), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3228445. 
19 See generally Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning 
of the End of Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMMC’N. TECH. L. 116 (2017). See also 
What is Ethereum, ETHERSCIPTER,  https://etherscripter.com/what_is_ethereum.html (last 
visited Nov. 9, 2019) (describing popular smart contract Ethereum as “a new kind of law” 
that can be “perfectly observed and enforced”). 
20 The fish rots from the head. See NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR 
DIGITAL MARKETS 1 (1996) (defining smart contracts as “a set of promises, specified in 
digital form, including protocols within which the parties perform on these promises”). In 
recent years, Szabo has vociferously defended the term. See, e.g., Nick Szabo 
(@NickSzabo4), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2018, 6:38 PM), 
https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4/status/1051603179526270976 (“‘Smart contract’ is a very 
useful concept & phrase. ‘Smart’ as in ‘smart phone’ (shorthand for computerized phone), 
‘contract’ meaning it does some important things we previously relied on contracts to do 
for our deals, especially controlling assets & incentivizing performance.”). 
21 Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal Automation, 87 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (2019). 
22 Werbach and Cornell argue that smart contracts are distinctive because “juridical 
forums are powerless to stop the execution of smart contracts—there is no room to bring 
an action for breach when breach is impossible.” Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, 
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 314, 332 (2017). A different leading account focuses 
on decentralized execution as well.  “[S]mart contracts are digital contracts allowing terms 
contingent on decentralized consensus that are tamper-proof and typically self-enforcing 
through automated execution.” Lin William Cong & Zhiguo He, Blockchain Disruption and 
Smart Contracts, 32 REV. FIN. STUD. 1754 (2019). 
23 Jeffrey J. Lipshaw, The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & 
POL’Y. 1, 22 (2019) (key characteristics, “in addition to consensus, include immutability 
and finality from the time they are created and going forward”). 
24 Adam Kolber, Not-So Smart Blockchain Contracts and Artificial Responsibility, 21 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 198, 208 (2018) (“easy to verify program execution”). 
25 Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Smart Contracts, 2019 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 103, 113 (2019) (describing smart contracts as “self-enforcing,“ “self-
governing,” and with “no ambiguity around the parties’ obligations”). 
26 Christopher D. Clack, Vikram A. Bakshi, & Lee Braine, Smart Contract Templates: 
Foundations, Design Landscape and Research Directions, ARXIV, 1608.0071v3, Mar. 2017, 
at 2. See also Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 
305 (2017) (“A smart contract is an agreement whose execution is automated.”). 
27 See Kolber, supra note 24, at 208. 
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how can we fairly evaluate the risk it poses, or the benefits it 
promises, to our commercial and social life? 
Smart contracts’ flabby meaning is not this Article’s precise 
target.28 Rather we offer a focused description of the most 
celebrated aspect of the underlying technology and its 
relationship to legal order. We’ll start by introducing a new term 
that we think captures what most people in this field think of 
when they consider “smart contracts” as they are currently 
deployed. We name and describe the transactional script.29 Here 
is a parsimonious definition (that we’ll unpack later):30 
 
A transactional script is a persistent piece of software residing 
on a public blockchain. When executed as a part of an 
exchange, the code effectuates a consensus change to the state 
of a ledger. 
 
We stress that our focus—for the moment—is narrower than 
all digitized exchanges,31 or even all deals accomplished through 
blockchain-style ledgers.32 That is, transactional scripts sit at the 
core of the rapidly expanding group of things called “smart 
contracts,” but do not encompass the whole field. Crucially, 
transactional scripts are exchanges that operate in public—	
28 Cf. Ed Felten, Smart Contracts: Neither Smart nor Contracts?, FREEDOM TO TINKER 
(Feb. 20, 2017), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2017/02/20/smart-contracts-neither-smart-
not-contracts/. 
29 For a definition of smart contracts that tracks with our transactional script, see Carla 
L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373, 383 (2019) (“The term 
‘smart contract’ refers to decentralized computer code that runs on a DLT protocol and 
manifests some combination of the following characteristics: exerts some control over 
assets digitally recorded on a DLT protocol, takes some action upon receipt of specified 
data, is often, but not always, part of a DLT-based application, guarantees execution, and 
writes the resulting state change from the operation of the smart contract into the DLT's 
ledger.”) 
30 Cf. Peter G.L. Hunn, Smart Contracts as Techno-Legal Regulation, 7 J. ICT 
STANDARDIZATION 269, 275 (2019) (focusing on “a deterministic state machine” and a 
“consensus protocol” that provides agreement “on the same sequences of operations”). 
31 For a tremendous survey of that topic, see Harry Surden, Computable Contracts, 46 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 629 (2012). Surden discusses “autonomous computable contracting” only 
briefly. Id. at 695. 
32 The reader would benefit from reading the following excellent works on scripts (broadly 
defined). Sklaroff, supra note 17; J.G. Allen, Wrapped and Stacked: “Smart Contracts” and 
the Interaction of Natural and Formal Language, 14 EUR. R. CONT. L. 307 (2018); Werbach 
& Cornell, supra note 22; Karen E. C. Levy, Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-
Based Smart Contracts and The Social Workings of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & L. 1 
(2017); James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 2 J. L. & INNOVATION 
1 (2019); PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE 
OF CODE (2018); Jonathan Rohr, Smart Contracts in Traditional Contract Law, Or: The 
Law of the Vending Machine, 67 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 67 (2019); Edmund Schuster, Cloud 
Crypto-Land, 83 MODERN L REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 23-25) (on file with 
SSRN). 
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indeed, they are valuable in large part because their resolution 
must be agreed to by multiple different entities, jointly operating 
on an operating system with fixed and translucent rules. 
Transactional scripts are a striking legal innovation and 
much of the current interest in smart contracts in fact regards 
them.33 But law (and lawyers’) role in the creation and execution 
of scripts is unclear. Even apart from the performative techno-
libertarian claims about law’s abnegation, many scripting 
projects are missing many of the accoutrements of transactional 
law. More plainly put, currently deployed transactional scripts—
those that are exposing real people to financial and personal 
risks—often rely on the code alone as their primary risk-
allocation mechanism. And the code errs. 
In the Edgeware project, none of the governance promises 
were expressed in a natural language “contract” as we 
understand that term, even in the digital sphere, as in a click-
wrap agreement. They existed rather in a “white paper”—a self-
published document with no standard form and untested legal 
effect.34 That white paper states that users will receive 
“[d]ownside protection” in the case of “malicious 
attack/exploitation,” and describes the lockdrop contract as a 
failsafe technique.35 Moreover, the promotors suggest that it 
would be impossible to falsely claim ownership for an address.36 
Needless to say, these representations do not match the reality of 
what the buggy code delivered. But, equally obviously, since the 
code was public, its latent errors were also theoretically 
knowable, at least to sophisticated counterparties. 
Other examples of coding errors and oversights abound—
including the now infamous DAO hack, which we will discuss 
later.37 In many cases, the losers of coding errors have paid off the 	
33 See Smart Contracts Market Research Report - Global Forecast to 2023, MKT. RES. 
FUTURE (Jan. 2020),  (“The global smart contracts market is expected to reach 
approximately 300 USD Million by the end of 2023 . . . .“). Cf. Venture Capital Firms Go 
Deep and Wide with Blockchain Investments, 2 DIAR 39 (2018) (“[I]n just . . . three 
quarters of 2018, blockchain and crypto companies have raised nearly 3.9Bn through 
traditional VC – 280% more [than] last year . . . 
.”).https://www.marketresearchfuture.com/reports/smart-contracts-market-4588 (“The 
global smart contracts market is expected to reach approximately 300 USD Million by the 
end of 2023 . . . .“). Cf. Venture Capital Firms Go Deep and Wide with Blockchain 
Investments, DIAR, Oct. 1, 2018 (“[I]n just . . . three quarters of 2018, blockchain and crypto 
companies have raised nearly 3.9Bn through traditional VC – 280% more [than] last year 
. . . .”). 
34 Edgeware Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 9-15.  
35 Id. at 6-7. 
36 Id. at 11-12 (“Upon inspection [of the transaction hash], a verifier should have enough 
proof that if the owner of the . . . account did not also own the recipient Edgeware account 
(represented as the target address . . . ), then they would not issue such a transaction.”).	
37 See infra text accompanying notes 229-232. 
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winners to undo transactions.38 Such settlements occur in the very 
indistinct shadow of law: there isn’t a body of cases that directly 
address the question of what happens when transactional scripts 
go wrong.39 The academic literature too has largely downplayed 
the role and capabilities of law in resolving transactional scripts 
gone wrong.40  
Even the most sophisticated treatments in the literature 
largely focus on what happens when scripts accomplish their 
promised aims.41 Some argue that the technology is simply 
incapable of the sorts of error that law cares about: the “[c]ode 
typically entails no ambiguity, and no variant interpretation is 
possible.”42 Others lament that because the blockchain code is self-
contained, it contains no place within it for “default law” to exist.43 
Worse, even if there are places for law’s tools to have purchase, 
jurists “may not be able to hypothesize a reasonable human's 
interpretation of a given smart contract.”44   
Such handwaving is an unwarranted, and ultimately 
unworkable, surrender of the law’s role in adjudicating disputes.  
Code that embodies commercially-significant scripts will 
inevitably contain ambiguities, and disappointed parties will ask 
judges to adjudicate their rights. At the basic level, as James 
Grimmelmann has recently observed, the “meaning of any 
specific program rests on a foundation of some prior agreement 
about how to interpret some larger class of programs.”45 He 
concludes that while there may be fewer superficial examples of 
interpretative gaps in formal code, “when the bottom drops out, it 	
38 The literature has noted that often firms price bug bounties too low when compared with 
their after-market (and illegitimate) use.  Lorenz Breidenbach, Philip Daian, Florian 
Tramer & Ari Juels, Enter the Hydra: Toward Principled Bug Bounties and Exploit-
Resistant Smart Contracts, 27 PROC. USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 1335, 1335 (2018). It is 
difficult to know how common self-help is in the world of transactional scripts. Victims 
have little incentive to publicize their failure to write better code, while successful 
attackers may wish to avoid public renown (if not the tax authorities). 
39 See, e.g., Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 128, 141 
(2017) (discussing the application of contract and agency law to algorithmic contracts and 
noting lack of caselaw). 
40 Cf.  Dell’Erba, supra note 18, at 21 (“It could be that there may be a bug in the code or 
that the parties may reconsider what they want.”)  
41 Compare Werbach & Cornell, supra note 22, at 350-364 (things going well) with id. at 
365-367 (not as well). 
42 Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 BUS. LAW. 
109, 136 n.94 (2017-2018). 
43 Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 682 (2019) (“Because 
the smart “contract” is code alone, there is no gap, in the sense of an entry point, for the 
law to step in to fill.”) 
44 Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 42, at 136; Schmitz & Rule, supra note 25, at 104  (“Those 
with no coding background cannot easily interpret a smart contract in its rawest form.”) 
45 Grimmelmann, supra note 32, at 12.	
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can really drop out.”46 It’s then that law will be asked to step in 
and provide rational and predictable solutions, which will almost 
certainly be developed by analogy to off-chain exchanges. 
But analogies can deceive. Whereas scholars and jurists who 
confront questions about ordinary written contracts have a deep 
working knowledge of how such exchanges function, 
transactional scripts are functionally innovative and the legal 
community has yet to coalesce around even a basic understanding 
of what they are, let alone what they do. What’s needed, then, is 
a working knowledge of the ways in which the vocabulary and 
functioning of the code itself can create disconnects between the 
intent of the humans coding transactional scripts and the code’s 
function.47 Describing the plumbing of these phenomena is the 
first contribution of this Article, and occupies Part I. We make 
two fundamental observations.  
First, the coding language development environment of 
almost all extant transactional scripts has features (and entails 
uncommon practices) which make coding errors, and gaps 
between coders’ intent and expression, both likely to occur and 
difficult to resolve.48 Second, the dominant platform for scripts—
Ethereum—assesses a tax on complex programs. This fee makes 
transactional scripts unsuited for many knotty contracting 
problems, unless their drafters make parts of the code non-public, 
thus stripping scripts of much of what makes them an elegant 
solution to problems of trust in exchange. 
With a better grasp of how scripts operate, Part II uses case 
examples to argue—contrary to the dominant account—that 
these scripts fail in ways that are legible to traditional 
contractual frameworks.  Put simply, they fail to accomplish their 
parties’ intent. Those examples start with “tokens” issued in 
“initial coin offerings,” continue with decentralized exchanges, 
and finally consider so-called “oracles.” We describe both the 
coded and natural language promises accompanying these 
projects. Each such category of transactional script has been 
touted as a revolutionary financial innovation. Each, as we’ll 
show, have already produced errors with real legal consequences.  
In Part III, we ask how law ought to respond to the sorts of 
problems occasioned by such systematic failures of transactional 	
46 Id. at 20 (further stating that the community can “redefine the programming language 
in a way that radically alters the meaning of programs written in it.”) 
47 On the problems caused by blockchain jargon, see Angela Walch, Blockchain's 
Treacherous Vocabulary: One More Challenge for Regulators, 21 J. INTERNET L., Aug. 
2017, at 1. 
48 See Elaine Ou, Blockchain is Littered with Smart Contracts Gone Bad, INS. J. (Nov. 16, 
2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2017/11/16/471387.htm. 
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scripts. We argue that the layering of transactional script and 
natural language promise is best understood as producing a 
contract stack. Contract stacks are inevitable when parties come 
together to accomplish commercial ends, even if they try their 
hardest to make the code the final answer to all their problems. 
Collecting the meager extant caselaw, and deploying old 
fashioned rules of interpretation, we offer a novel framework 
through which courts ought to compile such stacks and thus make 
sense of these new forms of commercial exchange.  
The framework we offer, though focused on the scripted 
ecosystem of the moment, has general application. Future 
iterations of digitized transactions, whether using blockchain or 
other forms of software, will require courts to make sense of gaps 
between natural language promises and coded executions. Our 
approach brings old principles of common law to bear on the 
problems that the next generation of contract practitioners and 
academics will face. 
 
I.  DESIGNING EXPENSIVE, BUGGY SCRIPTS 
 
We begin with a precise account of the creation and function 
of transactional scripts. To the extent that the discussion requires 
struggling with new jargon, our petard has been well-hoisted.49 
Our goal is not merely to demystify this technology, but also the 
world and social practices of coders whose work increasingly 
matters to law and transactional practice. We make two primary 
contributions. First, we try to explain why code is intrinsically 
buggy.  Second, we offer some reasons to be skeptical about 
scripts’ innate ability to solve simultaneously solve problems of 
trust, complexity and automation of deals. 
 We start with the functional question of how coders go about 
their work. 
 
A.   How (Commercial) Coding Works 
 
The process of taking a programmer’s intent from code to 
execution involves multiple steps, each of which can and does 
introduce error. Just as when law firms draft contracts, 
programming progresses in pieces and through teams.50  	
49 Cf. ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A 
LAWYER” (2007) (the classic text on how law students are taught to think and argue in 
distinctive ways). 
50 On “flexible standardization” and the production of contracts in law firms, see Matthew 
Jennejohn, The Architecture of Contract Design, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71 (2018). 
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Programming teams typically start with a human-driven goal. 
They then choose a language in which to code. Typically, coders 
will choose a high-level language that abstracts away the details 
of the machine’s hardware and allows programming in syntax 
closer to natural language. 
Transactional scripts are commonly coded in Solidity, the 
language conceived alongside of, and for use on, Ethereum, the 
platform on which most scripts operate.51 It is syntactically 
similar to the popular, web-development language, Javascript 
and thus looks familiar to many non-smart-contract coders. To 
create a transactional script in Solidity, a coder creates a text file 
with contents that conform to the publicly available specification 
of the Solidity language, and that capture in programmatic form 
the design goal.52 
Like traditional contract drafters, transactional script 
developers freely use boilerplate.  A significant fraction of code in 
open source software projects is copied.53 This practice is also 
prominent within the transactional scripts world, with one study 
finding in 95% of implementations that performed a common 
function, coders had used identical syntax.54 Reusing or 
retrofitting code for new ends serves multiple purposes for 
developers. Reuse decreases development time, may provide 
ready-made, secure and compatible solutions for difficult coding 
problems. Code reuse can also cause problems, making developers 
reliant on code they may not understand, propagating bugs, and 
increasing development time where reused code is difficult to 
understand or adapt.55 
Knitting together these pieces of boilerplate with bespoke 
code is an iterative process, and programs are created across 	
51 For a good overview of the coding ecosystem, see Raina Haque, Rodrigo Seira, Brent 
Plummer & Nelson Rosario, Blockchain Development and Fiduciary Duty, 2 STAN. J. 
BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y. 139, 146-51 (2019). 
52 For more on the process of open source development in blockchain generally, see Angela 
Walch, Open-Source Operational Risk: Should Public Blockchains Serve as Financial 
Market Infrastructures? in 2 HANDBOOK OF BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL FINANCE, AND 
INCLUSION 252-254 (David Lee, Kuo Chuen & Robert D Deng eds., 2017). 
53 Developers report a mean 30% of functionality is derived from reused code. See Sojer & 
Henkel, Code Reuse in Open Source Software Development: Quantitative Evidence, 
Drivers, and Impediments, 11 J. ASS’N. FOR INFO. SYSS. 2 (2010), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/84f7/9b045d79c6af2f20aab35547205011743f0d.pdf 
54 See Yi Zhou, Deepak Kumar, Surya Bakshi, Joshua Mason, Andrew Miller, & Michael 
Bailey, Erays: Reverse Engineering Ethereum’s Opaque Smart Contracts, 27 PROC. 
USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 1371, 1371 (2018),  
https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity18/sec18-zhou.pdf. 
55 Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices, GITHUB: CONSENSYS: ETHEREUM SMART CONT. 
BEST PRACS., https://consensys.github.io/smart-contract-best-
practices/general_philosophy/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“A smart contract system from 
a software engineering perspective wishes to maximize reuse where reasonable.”) 
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multiple sessions consisting of coding and testing. To keep track 
of changes, and the contributions of many individuals,56 software 
projects use version control systems that themselves capture a log 
of each change.57 To add a change to a version control system, 
coders are typically required to explicitly identify the change/s 
they wish to add, describe it in a “commit message” and send it to 
a server that tracks the full set of changes across users.58 
 
When added to the system, the set of changes is termed a 
“commit.”59The commit log generated by a version control system 
thus contains evidence of the drafting process, both in code and 
human readable form. The log and code are available to all 
developers on a project and may sometimes be stored on a publicly 
accessible server. 	
56 Programmers will sometimes pair program: a reviewer assesses each line of code as the 
primary programmer is typing. The reviewer suggests changes, spots errors and often 
drives the strategic direction of the code. See, e.g., Laurie Williams, Robert R. Kessler, 
Ward Cunningham, & Ron Jeffries, Strengthening the Case for Pair Programming, 17 
IEEE SOFTWARE, July 2000, at 19. 
57 Distributed version control systems have much in common with blockchains. They 
record sequences of changes to a common, replicated record using a chained hash structure 
that ties together each new change with the complete past history. They do not solve 
consensus problems, relying on individuals to determine the outcome of conflicts. 
58 While decentralized version control systems (DVCS) such as git can in theory operate 
without a centralized server, the convenience of a host that is always online and 
authoritative ensures that most deployments use such a server. Common commercial 
services providers of these servers include Github, Gitlab and Bitbucket. 
59 
https://web.archive.org/web/20200116162012/https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/e
b0b56b19017ab5c16c745e6da39c53126924ed6.patch 
commit eb0b56b19017ab5c16c745e6da39c53126924ed6 
Author: Pieter Wuille <pieter.wuille@gmail.com> 
Date:   Fri Aug 1 22:57:55 2014 +0200 
 
   Simplify serialize.h's exception handling 
 
   Remove the 'state' and 'exceptmask' from serialize.h's stream 
   implementations, as well as related methods. 
 
   As exceptmask always included 'failbit', and setstate was always 
   called with bits = failbit, all it did was immediately raise an 
   exception. Get rid of those variables, and replace the setstate 
   with direct exception throwing (which also removes some dead 
   code). 
 
   As a result, good() is never reached after a failure (there are 
   only 2 calls, one of which is in tests), and can just be 
replaced 
   by !eof(). 
 
   fail(), clear(n) and exceptions() are just never called. Delete 
   them. 
Figure 1: A well written commit message from the Bitcoin core 
repository explaining the changes made and the reasoning 
behind them.59  
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 Large firms enforce discipline over this commit log system: 
commit messages must capture the intent and effect of a change. 
In smaller development outfits, programmers often fail to include 
meaningful commit messages and the log may thus poorly 
capture intent.60  
Another prominent practice common to well-disciplined 
development teams is code review. Before a server or team will 
accept a commit, it passes through human review. The review is 
performed by other team members, who comment on a platform 
integrated with the version control system. The reviewers assess 
all elements of the commit—the message, the quality of the code 
implementing the change and the intent of the change—and 
either accept, reject, or send the commit back for further review. 
Once a program is ready to be tested, it must be converted 
from the high-level language to machine instructions. The 
conversion is done through the aid of a compiler, a secondary 
program developed for this express purpose.61 Compilers, as 
software themselves, are imperfect. Rarely, they contain bugs 
that cause a mistranslation from the high-level language to the 
target language, further obscuring the link between programmer 
intent and program. They might also be designed maliciously or 
negligently.62 
However, if all goes well, the output from the compiling 
process is bytecode, a low-level representation of the high-level 
program that the computer can execute more directly.   To provide 
some concrete detail, we now turn to the blockchain platforms of 
interest. 	
60 Shortform commit messages can range from the insightful, “Simplify serialize h's 
exception handling,” to the banal, “fuck fuck holy shit fuck I think I finally fixed my shitty 
git fuck.” Ramiro Gómez, Exploring Expressions of Emotions in GitHub Commit Messages, 
GEEKSTA, https://geeksta.net/geeklog/exploring-expressions-emotions-github-commit-
messages/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
61 There are two primary ways programs are executed: directly, or through an interpreter. 
Directly executed programs undergo multiple translation (compilation) steps taking the 
program from humane-readable source code, to less-human readable assembly code, to 
machine readable instructions. See Introduction to Programming Languages/Compiled 
Programs, WIKIBOOKS (Sep. 29, 2019, 12:45 AM), 
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Introduction_to_Programming_Languages/Compiled_Progr
ams. Interpreted programs generally undergo a preliminary form of compilation but are 
not themselves converted into machine instructions. Rather, an interpreter executes the 
preliminary form by a set of rules acting on a virtual machine. See Introduction to 
Programming Languages/Interpreted Programs, WIKIBOOKS (Sep. 27, 2017, 6:49 PM), 
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Introduction_to_Programming_Languages/Interpreted_Pro
grams. 
62 See Ken Thompson, Reflections on Trusting Trust, Turing Award Lecture, 27 COMM’NS. 
ACM 761 (1984). Solidity compilers, with their relative closeness to blockchain based 
assets, make a similarly attractive target for attacks. The Solidity foundation maintains 
a list of known vulnerabilities. List of Known Bugs, SOLIDITY (last visited Nov. 9, 2019), 
https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.12/bugs.html. 
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B.  An Introduction to the Blockchain Platform 
 
Blockchains are already the subject of a large legal literature. 
Here, we sketch only the broadest strokes. Essentially, they are 
platforms for distributed data processing that create incentives 
for users to agree on, and store, outcomes of computation.63 A 
blockchain generally consists of two components: storage 
structures that track changes in the system and algorithms that 
ensure consistency of data across storage locations.  
A blockchain identifies data records by hashes: the output of 
an algorithm called a cryptographic hash function.64 This easy-to-
compute equation takes potentially voluminous data as input and 
produces a short, fixed-length, output—the hash. Critically, there 
are no known methods to easily perform the reverse 
computation.65 It is similarly hard to find two different sets of data 
that when fed into the function both produce the same hash.66  
This creates a tie between the input data and the hash. The hash 
acts as the “name” of the block, uniquely identifying it by its 
contents. 
Data is organized into blocks, with each block linking to a set 
of stored data. Each block contains a hash (below in bold) 
corresponding to the storage records linked to the block and the 
hash of the previous block (shown as “prev”). 
A block’s hash is computed by feeding the contents of the 
block into the hash function. The hash therefore is strongly tied 
to the data within the block, and also ties the block to those that 
come before. This property ensures an ordering to the blocks, 
creating the chain aspect of a blockchain. Updates (proposed or 	
63 See generally DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 33-49; Theophanis Stratopoulos & 
Jesús Calderón, Introduction to Blockchain (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 3395619, 2019), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3395619; NAT’L. INST. STANDARDS & 
TECH., IR8202, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8202. 
64 NAT’L. INST. STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 65, at 7-13; Stratopoulos & Calderón, supra 
note 65 at 34-40. 
65 Note: the cryptographic hash functions used for systems such as blockchains bear 
additional security properties. See JONATHAN KATZ & YEHUDA LINDELL, INTRODUCTION TO 
MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY 128-130 (2007). 
66 It would take around 720 times the age of the universe to find a collision for its hash 
function. See Ashif Shereef, A Physicist‘s Journey into Cracking the Bitcoin, HACKERNOON 
(Mar. 26, 2018), https://hackernoon.com/a-physicists-journey-into-cracking-bitcoin-
4631e57158cc. 
H1
prev: H0 H(data)
H2
prev: H1 H(data)
H3
prev: H2 H(data)
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accepted) to a blockchain are generally contained within 
“transactions”, small sets of machine instructions or 
transactional records that comprise the data within blocks.  A 
block is associated with transaction data through an additional 
hash stored within the block, in our figure this hash is depicted 
as H(data).67 
Using a chain as a public and trusted record requires a 
mechanism to achieve consensus on the contents of the record. 
Participants known as validators follow a well-defined set of rules 
that allow them to agree both on the validity of a particular chain, 
and the ordering (and acceptability) of any proposed updates to 
the chain.68 Participants connect to one another over the internet, 
forming a subnetwork within the larger network. Participants 
send and receive messages in a set format to indicate their 
responses to proposed changes to the blockchain.   
The blockchain records each update that has ever happened 
to the data it stores.  By viewing the record of changes, a viewer 
can access the historical state of the chain. The contents of a 
blockchain are fixed only so long as the participants agree about 
what constitutes the set of previous transactions.69 Moreover, 
while the record of past transactions may be unchanged, a future 
transaction may modify the ledger to make the most recent 
contents identical in substance to the contents at a prior time 
(differing records of the past notwithstanding).  
Protocols commonly feature validators who vie for the scarce 
opportunity to submit the next block to the network.70  Those that 
succeed at adding a block claim a reward.71 A cap on the amount 
of data that can be stored in a single block, in combination with 
	
67 The hash over the data is computed with the aid of an additional structure known as a 
Merkle Tree. The properties of a Merkle Tree allow one to easily notice if the contents of 
a particular transaction have changed without checking the entirety of the data. See 
Shaan Ray, Merkle Trees, HACKERNOON (Dec. 14, 2017), https://hackernoon.com/merkle-
trees-181cb4bc30b4. 
68 These rules are the protocol governing the system. See Grimmelman, supra note 34, at 
8. 
69 Forks serve as an “ever-present escape valve” from majority consensuses with which a 
minority of blockchain participants disagree. Haque et al., supra note 51, at 164. 
70 In such protocols, a subspecies of validators, miners, are also given the opportunity to 
mint a new unit of the corresponding cryptocurrency, updating the ledger to grant them 
ownership over the new coin. Haque et al, supra note 50, at 149. 
71 Opportunities to add blocks are allocated according to the consensus scheme, the two 
most popular of these being Proof-of-Work, which probabilistically allocates opportunities 
based on amount of computational effort spent, and Proof-of-Stake which probabilistically 
allocates opportunities in proportion to a miner’s staked cryptoasset.  
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the restricted opportunities to add blocks, limits the number of 
transactions that can be processed in a unit of time.72 
An individual wishing to transact via the network submits 
their proposed transaction to the peer-to-peer network and 
indicates how much they are willing to pay (in cryptocurrency) to 
have their transaction processed.73 Validators will process such 
user-submitted transactions, claiming associated processing fees. 
The size of the fee is inversely correlated with how long the 
network will take to process the transaction, as a larger fee more 
strongly incentivizes validators to include that transaction within 
the next block. 
Blockchain ledger entries are associated with identifiers 
known as addresses, which determine who controls particular 
ledger entries.74 Digital keys that grant control over assets (or 
data) stored in a given set of entries are stored in “wallets” which 
are files or programs containing these keys. Colloquially, some 
equate control with ownership, which is why you’ll hear about a 
wallet’s “owners.” Of course, access and the ability to modify 
doesn’t necessarily mean ownership, unless that apartment key 
you gave your dog walker was more significant than you thought. 
At its core, a cryptoasset is nothing more than an entry in the 
ledger, secured with a set of fancy tools that mean only those 
people who know the access digits can change its characteristics. 
Finally, public blockchains are typically designed so that 
validators or other users can unilaterally join and leave the 
network. Permissioned blockchains take a fundamentally 
different approach, admitting only preapproved validators to the 
consensus forming process. While potentially useful for a 
consortium of known parties, or for use within an individual 
business, permissioned blockchains rely on users’ trust in the list 
validators, preapproved by the entity operating the blockchain.75 
This limits their use in the low-trust marketplace for which 
	
72 Dubbed the scaling problem, maximizing transaction throughput is a highly active area 
of research. Proposed solutions include moving certain transactions off-chain, and other 
novel protocol designs. 
73 In some systems, portions of the transaction fee may be optional, but this may result in 
the network failing to ever process a transaction. 
74 These are normally derived from a users’ cryptographic keys or the result of a hash 
function applied to relevant data. 
75 See Sklaroff, supra note 17, at 276-77 n.50 (noting that ”the advantages of 
[permissioned] blockchains exist in tandem with reliance on offline identity” and that as 
a result, ”participants on permissioned blockchains are typically bound by off-chain, real-
world agreements”) (internal quotation omitted). 
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transactional scripts are most often touted.76  We therefore focus 
our analysis on the permissionless ecosystem.77  
 
C.  Ethereum and Scripting 
 
Bitcoin is an awkward commercial platform, mostly useful for 
recording and facilitating the flow of bitcoin transactions.78 
Realizing the utility of performing more complex operations on a 
blockchain, a programmer named Vitalik Buterin proposed and 
developed Ethereum, a blockchain based computing platform, 
with an associated cryptocurrency, ether. The protocol’s explicit 
goal was to permit enhanced scripting—more complicated logical 
operations than recording ownership—on a blockchain. 
Ethereum uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM)—a 
software system with predefined rules and operations, which you 
can think of as a simulated computer.79 	
76 Most commenters agree with Ian Kane, COO of TERNIO, in thinking that “permissioned 
blockchains have their place specifically in an enterprise environment.” Shehryar Hasan, 
Private Blockchains Are Bullshit, Expert Says, BLOCKPUBLISHER (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://blockpublisher.com/private-blockchains-are-bullshit-expert-says/. See also Justin 
O’Connell, What Are the Use Cases for Private Blockchains? The Experts Weigh In, BITCOIN 
MAG. (June 20, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/what-are-the-use-cases-for-
private-blockchains-the-experts-weigh-in-1466440884 (finding the value of private 
blockchains in their ability to “provide interesting opportunities for businesses to leverage 
[their] trustless and transparent foundation for internal and business-to-business use 
cases”). Cf. THE EU BLOCKCHAIN OBSERVATORY & FORUM, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE GDPR 16 
(2018), 
https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/sites/default/files/reports/20181016_report_gdpr.pdf 
(suggesting that permissioned blockchains might need permissionless blockchains in order 
to be globally interoperable). 
77 The computer science literature explores a variety of scenarios in which network 
participants have greater or lesser trust in other participants. These works occupy the 
space between assuming an overwhelming majority of participants are honest, and 
assuming preexisting trusted relationships with other network participants (permissioned 
models). Such constitute a middle ground between permissioned and permissionless 
approaches to distributed computation, and generally represent a trade-off between 
scalability and trust. While laudable efforts reduce the level of trust that it is necessary to 
sacrifice for substantial gains in scalability, these subtleties are not the focus of our work. 
For treatment of a technique for scaling blockchain computations and for a discussion on 
other approaches, see Harry Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Xiaoqi Chen, S. Matthew 
Weinberg & Edward W. Felten, Arbitrum: Scalable, Private Smart Contracts, 27 PROC. 
USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 1353, 1353 (2018). 
78 While Bitcoin can be scripted to perform sophisticated tasks, doing so is challenging and 
coders wishing to do so must work against the limited functionality of the platform. 
79 Kolber, supra note 24, at 208. Solidity, the most common language used to program 
Ethereum Transactional scripts is Turing complete, meaning it can in theory perform any 
program. This is limited only by the restrictions the protocol places on complexity to 
mitigate denial of service attacks. See Niharika Singh, Turing Completeness and the 
Ethereum Blockchain, HACKERNOON (Feb. 16, 2019), https://hackernoon.com/turing-
completeness-and-the-ethereum-blockchain-c5a93b865c1a. The EVM draws its 
inspiration from common models of computer architecture with modifications that ensure 	
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The Ethereum virtual machine enables programs to store 
data on the Ethereum blockchain and defined how the original 
data could be modified.80 By the nature of the blockchain, all data 
is public and therefore replicable; the EVM, however, allows 
developers to restrict how the data may be modified. Storage and 
control, in turn, created the platform for transactional scripts. 
Scripts are programs operating on Ethereum which when 
executed (or “called”) affect the ledger itself. 
The instruction set provided by Ethereum is as powerful and 
expressive as any other programming language. If limits are not 
imposed on transactional script running time and resource 
requirements, a malicious actor could force validators to perform 
never ending computations, halting all useful work on the chain. 
Ethereum therefore imposes what we term a complexity tax: 
transaction fees proportional to the computation required by a 
transaction. This fee is known as gas and is paid in fractional 
amounts of ether.81 The Ethereum protocol specifies a hard limit 
on how much gas may be consumed by a single transaction.82 
Thus, the amount of gas paid per transaction is determined by the 
Ethereum protocol, while the exchange rate is determined by the 
user.  The user must also pre-pay gas that in their estimation will 
sufficiently cover costs. If this pre-payment is too low, and there 
is insufficient gas to completely execute the script, the script will 
terminate without a refund.83 	
the integrity of scripts’ code. While this architecture is foreign to the computers on which 
the software runs, it is simulated by way of the virtual machine. See Preethi Kasireddy, 
How Does Ethereum Work Anyway?, MEDIUM (Sep. 27, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@preethikasireddy/how-does-ethereum-work-anyway-22d1df506369. 
80 For a more complete discussion on the limits of the Bitcoin model, see ConsenSys, 
Thoughts on UTXO by Vitalik Buterin, MEDIUM (Mar. 9, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@ConsenSys/thoughts-on-utxo-by-vitalik-buterin-2bb782c67e53. As 
agents are able to manipulate the records stored on the blockchain, transactional scripts 
are able to transfer value contingent on those records. This is the true source of their 
utility over other types of programs that interact with distributed databases: the tight 
integration of an asset storage mechanism (cryptocurrencies and cryptoassets) with a 
programmatic way to transfer ownership (transactional scripts). The coupling of the two 
ensures that the value of the asset is conditional on playing by the rules of the game – 
which in turn provides certain assurances that the contracts will be executed. 
81 For a detailed explanation of the internal mechanisms of Ethereum, see generally 
Kasireddy, supra note 81. 
82 At the time of writing, this was set at approximately 8 million gas (with an upcoming 
change to 10 million gas), equivalent to ~$2 USD at a gas price of 1 Gwei (billionths of an 
ETH). 
83 Existing literature describes the complexity tax in general terms without elaborating on 
its exact costs. See, e.g., Thibault Schrepel, Is Blockchain the Death of Antitrust Law? The 
Blockchain Antitrust Paradox, 3 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 281, 292 (2019) (noting that 
Ethereum rewards successful miners with transaction fees); Sklaroff, supra note 17, at 
293 n.139 (describing the "supply and demand dynamic” created and its policing effects on 
“buggy or infinitely recursive code”); id. at 295 n.143 (“[T]his solution would be 
prohibitively expensive from a transaction fee perspective”). 
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There are 70 different operations understood by the EVM, 
each of which is associated with a cost, based on the amount of 
time and energy it takes a validator to execute the operation. 
Here are only a few, with their associated costs. 
 
Operation 
Name 
Max Cost 
(Gas) 
Cost ($)/1 million 
operations84 
Effect 
ADD 3 ~$30 Adds two numbers together 
MUL 5 ~$50 Multiplies two numbers 
SSLOAD 200 ~$2000 
Load a single number 
from permanent 
storage85 
SSTORE 20000 ~$200,000 
Store a single number 
into permanent 
storage 
 
The most expensive operation, SSTORE, updates data that 
constitute the Ethereum ledger’s memory. As it adds to the long-
term cost of storing the ledger, the protocol imposes a substantial 
up-front fee. 
Data storage on a public ledger forms a key component of 
many proposed blockchain use-cases,86 but is financially costly in 
comparison to general purpose storage (which is available from 
commercial providers on a yearly basis at approximately one-ten-
millionth of the cost of Ethereum based storage).87 Similarly, the 
processor in a typical laptop performs on the order of billions of 
operations per second, which would equate to hundreds of dollars’ 
worth of computations on Ethereum.88 Gas costs don’t stem from 	
84 These figures are calculated at the default gas price of 𝟑 × 𝟏𝟎%𝟖 gas/ETH and an 
exchange rate of $295 USD/ETH with data sourced from https://hackernoon.com/ether-
purchase-power-df40a38c5a2f rounded up to one significant figure 
85 The maximum value on which the EVM operates on in a single operation is 𝟐^𝟐𝟓𝟔. 
Outside of technical reasons for this choice, this limit prevents coders from storing all their 
data represented as one huge number in an attempt to pay lower gas costs. 
86 Even for systems that purport to store the bulk of data off-chain, the cost of storing 
references to the off-chain data necessitates a cost-benefit approach to assessing the 
viability of a blockchain based solution. See MEDICALCHAIN, WHITEPAPER 2.1 (2018), 
https://medicalchain.com/Medicalchain-Whitepaper-EN.pdf (observing that while records 
themselves are stored off chain, each update to a record necessitates storing a new value 
on the blockchain); ARMAN JABBARI & PHILIP KAMINSKY, BLOCKCHAIN AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT (2018),  (envisioning large-scale supply-chain data storage on the 
blockchain.)http://www.mhi.org/downloads/learning/cicmhe/blockchain-and-supply-
chain-management.pdf (envisioning large-scale supply-chain data storage on the 
blockchain). 
87 See Amazon S3 Pricing, AWS AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/s3/pricing/ (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2020). 
88 Some sites modern processors at the tens of billions of floating-point operations per 
second, that on the scale of our illustrations, are comparable with the basic arithmetic 	
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the regular unit cost of storing a chunk of data or performing a 
computation.89 They are artifacts of the replicated work and 
storage used to maintain and validate consensus.90 
This complexity tax has limited, but real implications. We 
concede that neither storage nor complex programming are what 
blockchains are for, and such special purpose tools shouldn’t be 
evaluated in comparison with traditional computers. But it’s 
important to recognize that for some proposed uses of 
transactional scripts—such as encoding semantic frameworks 
like discretion, good faith, and best efforts—public blockchain 
solutions incur significant costs.91 
The result of such costs is that it is practically impossible to 
run some kinds of scripts in public. Many real-world 
computational tasks (searching and sorting large amounts of 
data, machine learning, optimization) require non-trivial 
amounts of computational power and/or data storage. For 
example, though it would be potentially useful to write a script 
that used an algorithm to determine if a worker had used her best 
efforts, and then pay her for her time, that kind of computation is 
not practical other than by delegating the computation to an 
agent “off-chain.” Current scripts thus generally contain only the 
simplest of if-then type logic.92  A useful analysis of the legal 
significance of our scripts requires a clear-eyed evaluation as to 
the likely future uses and limitations of the form. 
There is a robust technical literature exploring mechanisms 
to avoid the complexity tax. But most proposals to mitigate costs 
trade-off between the security and transparency of the on-chain 	
operations of the EVM. See, e.g., CPU Performance, ASTEROIDS AT HOME, 
https://asteroidsathome.net/boinc/cpu_list.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
89 Noted blockchain researcher Emin Gün Sirer correctly notes that costs of storing the 
blockchain itself are negligible on a per node basis. Emin Gün Sirer (@el33th4xor), 
TWITTER, (Nov. 29, 2019, 1:13 PM), 
https://twitter.com/el33th4xor/status/1200477778463907841). Our concern is how this 
cost is magnified by current consensus protocols. 
90 These particular costs are distinct from the computational cost incurred by Proof-of-
Work style consensus algorithms, that establish consensus in the first instance. Rather, 
the need to check the validity of the output from computations and maintain copies of the 
output (to allow failure recovery), impose a cost that is paid ex ante by a tax on expensive 
computations. 
91 While Sklaroff, supra note 17, notes the potential high ex ante cost of developing 
contracts flexible enough to incorporate legal frameworks, we here quantify those costs, 
focus on the ongoing taxes imposed by the blockchain paradigm, and expands on coding 
realities that further drive development costs. 
92 The quarrelsome reader may note that all imperative paradigm programming adheres 
to an if-then paradigm. We merely note the paucity of sophistication in scripts currently 
deployed. For a brief discussion on different programming paradigms see Jing Chen, A 
Brief Survey of “Programming Paradigms“, MEDIUM (Apr. 11, 2019), 
https://medium.com/@jingchenjc2019/a-brief-survey-of-programming-paradigms-
207543a84e2b. 
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model, and the efficiency attainable under frameworks that 
assume more on the part of other protocol participants.93 While 
there are some improvements that can be made to efficiently scale 
blockchains without compromising the promise of truly trustless 
exchange,94 the most effective solutions will inevitably delegate 
the bulk of computation and storage to smaller subsets of the 
network or even to non-participants off chain.95  
The complexity tax thus produces a real hurdle for certain 
kinds of complex contracting.  There are known techniques to 
reduce the cost of most computations, but finding a way to 
minimize blockchain data storage costs while ensuring the data 
is accessible on demand is an open problem.96 Firms considering 
off-chain solutions must therefore ask whether the game is worth 
the candle. That is, public blockchains have important virtues: 
primarily, they enable trustless exchange between pseudo-
anonymous counterparties. Blockchain-based alternatives may 
not have those virtues. 
 
Coding on Ethereum 
 
We now return to our coders’ work and focus on how they 
write transactional scripts. Let’s suppose that a team of coders 
has authored high-level code and run that code through the 
compiler, producing bytecode that can now be executed on the 
EVM.  
 If they are responsible, they must now test the program; only 
after testing will it be deployed. During development 
programmers will go through many, many cycles of coding, 
	
93 For an analysis of various designs facilitating off-chain computation by a smaller 
number of nodes, reducing the cost imposed by large scale replication of work, see Gudeon 
Moreno-Sanchez, Stefanie Roos, Patrick McCorry & Arthur Gervais, SoK: Off The Chain 
Transactions, 2019 IACR EPRINT 360, https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/360; Kyle Croman, 
Christian Decker, Eyal Adem, Efe Gencer, Ari Juels, Ahmed Kosba, Andrew Miller, 
Prateek Saxena, Elaine Shi, Emin Gün Sirer, Dawn Song & Roger Wattenhofer, On 
Scaling Decentralized Blockchains, in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY- 
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOPS 2016 (Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 964 LNCS, 2016). 
94 One proposal that succeeds in maintaining a trustless network while improving 
substantially on scaling is the Avalanche Protocol, which proposes an alternative to proof-
of-work. See Kyle Croman, Christian Decker, Eyal Adem, Efe Gencer, Ari Juels, Ahmed 
Kosba, Andrew Miller, Prateek Saxena, Elaine Shi, Emin Gün Sirer, Dawn Song & Roger 
Wattenhofer, Scalable and Probabilistic Leaderless BFT Consensus through Metastability, 
1905 ARXIV 08936 (2019). However even protocols that minimize computational costs such 
as Avalanche and Arbitrum (for a description of the latter, see Kalodner et al., supra note 
79) still don’t realize the promise of effectively free transactional scripts.  
95 Importantly for our analysis of buggy scripts in Part III, even where off-chain scaling 
techniques are adopted, the code remains publicly accessible.  
96 See Croman et al., supra note 93. 
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compiling and testing, finding bugs and areas that need 
improvement.  
To make the discussion more concrete, we present the Staged 
Contract script, written in Solidity, and explain how it is 
processed by the virtual machine. It illustrates a simple deal: the 
owner of the script agrees to pay for work in increments of 1ETH 
as the recipient completes stages of some off-chain job.97 The 
recipient can claim payment for each stage without the 
intervention of the owner up to the total value of the contract.  
	
97 Not depicted is a mechanism for the owner to increase the amount of payment available 
over time. 
Figure 2: Transactional Script in Solidity 
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StagedContract also allows the recipient to offer a discount 
through the discount() function which the owner can approve via 
the approveDiscount() function. Illustrative of the complexity tax, 
at time of writing, it cost $1.30 to deploy the script and $0.08 to 
execute the completeStage() function even once. (Imagine using 
this script for payment of hundreds of thousands of gig workers.) 
Like most computer programs, Solidity requires the 
availability of fundamental computational structures:98 basic 
arithmetic operations, operations to access and modify some form 
of memory (the “state”), a way to input/output data, and crucially, 
a mechanism to choose between different possible execution paths 
based on the state of the computer. These are the key elements 
implemented by the EVM.  
Even this very simple script requires expertise to conceive of, 
implement and deploy. It requires still more expertise to 
recognize that it contains a serious bug. Noting that if an integer 
grows or shrinks beyond the limit set by the EVM (overflow and 
underflow respectively), the integer resets, a sneaky recipient 
could mount the following attack:99  
1. The recipient offers a discount that reduces the cost of 
the job to nothing, which the greedy owner readily 
accepts.  
2. The recipient offers an additional discount in advance 
of future work and waits until just before the owner 
approves it.  
3. The recipient quickly engorges their discount to the 
maximum size permitted by the EVM. 
4. The unsuspecting owner fails to notice the change and 
approves the oversized discount, reducing the sum 
available for payment so much that it underflows—
resetting the amount available for payment to the 
maximum value permitted by the EVM. 
5. The recipient now executes completeStage() 
repeatedly, emptying the script of its ether, without 
running into the limit.       
This is but one of many ways in which the specifics of the 
EVM can trip up otherwise code-literate individuals 
The particular problem for scripts is that when they are 
already on blockchain and parties have begun committing assets, 
they can’t be easily modified (at least without pushing out a 	
98 These, along with the ability to execute loops, are also the elements that permit the 
EVM to support a Turing complete language. See Singh, supra note 79. 
99 While the scenario is admittedly contrived, it serves to illustrate the difficulty of writing 
correct code. 
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unilateral update which might cause serious reputational 
blowback). Therefore, wise developers would first try it out on 
“test-nets,” small scale blockchains replicating the behavior of 
their larger siblings, but without the goal of preserving 
immutability or value long term. Testnets are also used to trial 
changes to the core protocol of a blockchain, without impacting 
existing users. Testnet transactions are generally free. 
When a developer is ready to test their transactional script, 
either on the real network or on the testnet, they submit a special 
transaction to the network. The transaction includes the bytecode 
of the transactional script, an amount of gas to pay for the 
deployment, and a wallet from which the gas will be transferred 
out. The transactional script is then stored on the blockchain, and 
its component functions and storage can be accessed. 
Modern programming languages, including Solidity and the 
Ethereum EVM instruction set, separate segments of code that 
perform discrete operations into “functions,” each of which 
require a developer using the function to provide certain inputs. 
Once a function finishes executing, it produces an output which 
is provided to either the user or, in instances where a function is 
executed (“called”) within another function (the “caller”), the 
output is available for use within the caller. To call a function, the 
caller must also include gas sufficient to pay for the execution of 
the callee (and in a recursive fashion for any functions the callee 
might call).  
This all assumes the coders have implemented each step of 
this process correctly. But, as the StagedContract example 
illustrates, errors can be subtle. There simply is no foolproof 
method to generate software that matches its initial 
specification.100. Further, even as software is patched to remove old 
bugs many new bugs creep in, and software does not converge to 
a bug-free state.101 
Penetration testing and security auditing are other 
important components of sophisticated software development. 
Specialized security engineers attempt to find and exploit 
security flaws and assess the quality of code as relevant to 
	
100 See Wenbo Guo, Dongliang Mu, Xinyu Xing, Min Du & Dawn Song, DEEPVSA: 
Facilitating Value-set Analysis with Deep Learning for Postmortem Program Analysis, 28 
PROC. USENIX SECURITY SYMP. 1787, 1787 (2019). 
101 See Saender A. Clark, The Software Vulnerability Ecosystem: Software Development 
in the Context of Adversarial Behavior (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of Pennsylvania) (on file with Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations, University of 
Pennsylvania). 
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security.102 However, security failures bedevil even the best 
audited software packages.103 The real test for code, particularly 
when designed to operate adversarial environments, comes only 
when it is deployed and used. It is often only when the code meets 
the road that developers find the bulk of bugs, improving on their 
code by constant iteration.104 Even then, vulnerabilities may 
remain latent for long periods of time prior to discovery.105  
These characteristics of the vulnerability life cycle pose 
challenges for a transactional script developer, where there are 
limited opportunities for safe testing on a live blockchain or 
patching ex post. Worse, the semantics of the Solidity coding 
language in which almost all transactional scripts are written are 
substantially different from traditional software development, 
leading to overconfident developers ignoring potential pitfalls 
such as reentrancy vulnerabilities that are not present in most 
coding environments.106 
The need for security also imposes a second, more 
metaphysical “complexity tax:” the more complex a transactional 
script , the harder it is to preserve both the coders intention (and 
the intention of the person hiring the coder and so on), while not 	
102 Due to the level of specialization required, such engineers or testers are contracted from 
boutique firms, with fees comparable to those of high-end lawyers. This puts many well 
performing service firms outside the price range of the majority of transactional script 
developers. See ekotysh, How Much Does a Smart Contract Audit Cost?, Posting to 
r/ethdev, REDDIT (July 24, 2017, 11:03 PM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/6pdgvd/how_much_does_a_smart_contract_a
udit_cost/.  
103 OpenSSL, one of the most scrutinized software packages (and which underlies much of 
the cryptography used to secure the internet), has disclosed over 11 high-severity 
vulnerabilities since 2014, despite having been created prior to 2002. See Vulnerabilities, 
OPEN SSL, https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). 
104 Some experts estimate the density of bugs is 10-50 per KLOC (1000 lines of code), and 
as few as that even Microsoft with its sophisticated development practices still releases 
code with a bug density of ~0.5 per KLOC. The is equivalent to tens-of-thousands of bugs 
in a modern operating system compiled from tens-of-millions of lines of code. See STEVE 
MCCONNELL, CODE COMPLETE: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK OF SOFTWARE CONSTRUCTION (2nd 
ed. 2004). 
105 See Clark, supra note 101. 
106 Reentrancy vulnerabilities are a class of flaw wherein a function calls another function 
that is external to the given script, and that callee unexpectedly calls the original function 
before the original function has finished executing. See Known Attacks, GITHUB: 
CONSENSYS: ETHEREUM SMART CONT. BEST PRACS., https://consensys.github.io/smart-
contract-best-practices/known_attacks/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2020). Programming 
language considerations that contribute to the difficulty of developing secure and correct 
Solidity code include the potential for “integer overflow” (where the size of numbers 
exceeds the space available to store them), a lack of support for decimal numbers and 
incomplete formal specification of the language. For a further description of these and 
others, see throwies, What Are the Main Security Problems Associated with Solidity 
Language?, Posting to r/ethdev, REDDIT (Jan. 18, 2018, 5:44 PM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethdev/comments/7rdocn/what_are_the_main_security_problem
s_associated/. 
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creating any insecurities; more development time must be 
expended to shore up the code.107 The bigger the transactional 
script ship, the more effort must be expended to patch the leaks.  
 
E.  Summary 
 
A recent survey of script developers suggests that coders are 
becoming increasingly aware of the problematic real-world 
consequences of how Solidity interacts with development have 
real world consequences.108 Developers, many of whom were 
working for free,109 had ideological motives: to “create a 
decentralized currency that cannot be manipulated by a central 
authority.”110 That is, “removing power from banks and 
governments.”111 These were motivated, committed, blockchain 
proponents. 
But the survey respondents noted that the abovementioned 
security concerns and high stakes made coding difficult.  “[In] 
most [non-blockchain projects] when a bug appears, it will be 
fixed and soon forgotten. But in blockchain projects some bugs 
can be very costly and never forgotten.”112 Similarly, some 
complained that erroneous ledger entries are “almost impossible” 
to fix.  These unique blockchain problems, when coupled with the 
decentralized VM on which software operates, “makes it difficult 
to build robust software. Unreliable connections, unexpected 
latency, and malicious nodes create a hostile production 
environment.”113 There are also few production-ready tools to work 
through errors in scripts, particularly a “reliable and user-
friendly decompiler.”114 
In sum: it’s simply impossible to create perfect software the 
first time through, and existing tools to pre-test scripts before 
deployment are inadequate or extremely costly. Irreducible 
features of Ethereum (and other blockchains designed using the 
same logics) will render transactional scripts buggy. One recent 
study, looking only at the very simple ecosystem of scripts on 	
107 See generally Yonghee Shin, Andrew Meneely, Laurie Williams & Jason A. Osborne, 
Evaluating Complexity, Code Churn, and Developer Activity Metrics as Indicators of 
Software Vulnerabilities, 37 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 772 (2010). 
108 See Amiangshu Bosu, Anindya Iqbal, Rifat Shahriyar & Partha Chakroborty, 
Understanding the Motivations, Challenges and Needs of Blockchain Software Developers: 
A Survey, 24 EMPIRICAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 2636 (2019). 
109 Id. at 11-14. 
110 Id. at 15. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 17. 
113 Id. at 18. 
114 Id. at 25. 
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Ethereum, found 100 errors per 1000 lines of code.115 This error 
rate likely will increase as developers pursue ever-more-
ambitious Ethereum projects. As bugs accrue and create real-life 
losses, parties will turn to tribunals and to the law for recourse. 
In the next section, we offer some concrete examples of this 
insight. 
 
II. TRANSACTIONAL SCRIPTS IN THE REAL WORLD 
 
Now that we have in hand a better understanding of what 
writing a transactional script entails—and where error might 
creep into that process—let’s consider three typical use cases of 
scripts in the current blockchain ecosystem. 
 
A. Tokens  
 
A basic use of a transactional script is to change a blockchain 
record to debit a cryptocurrency from a single address’ entry and 
credit the entries of other addresses. However, the flexibility of 
the EVM allows for more sophisticated types of trades, both of 
ether (the Ethereum-defined base currency) and script-defined 
cryptoassets. 
ERC-20 is the Ethereum technical standard that provides a 
template for creating a fungible, tradeable asset, known as a 
token.116  Such tokens are the most common cryptoasset. Token 
balances are not stored by the owner of the token. Instead, the 
transactional script that created the asset an internal ledger of 
addresses and their corresponding token balances. Below we 
provide some of the code that creates such tokens. 
In the following script excerpt the variable balances serves as 
the scripts’ internal ledger of account balances.  While any human 
can manually inspect the ledger, an Ethereum script can only 
access the balances via the balanceOf() which outputs the balance 	
115 Jakub J. Szczerbowski, Place of Smart Contracts in Civil Law. A Few Comments on 
Form and Interpretation, 12 PROCS. ANN. INT’L. SCI. CONF. NEW TRENDS 2017 (Nov. 9, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3095933; Ivica Nikolic, Aashish Kolluri, Ilya Sergey, 
Prateek Saxena & Aquinas Hobor, Finding the Greedy, Prodigal, and Suicidal Contracts 
at Scale 1, ARXIV (Mar. 14, 2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.06038 (finding a 3.5% 
vulnerability rate across an analysis of one million scripts); Giuseppe Destefanis, et al., 
Smart Contracts Vulnerabilities: A Call for Blockchain Software Engineering?, 2018 
PROCS. INT. WORKSHOP BLOCKCHAIN ORIENTED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING (IWBOSE) 19-
25 (“The feeling of many software engineers about such huge interest in Blockchain 
technologies . . . is that of unruled and hurried software development.”)  
116 The standard requires a compliant script to include a method to determine the total 
number of such tokens in circulation, the number of tokens owned by a given address, and 
functions that facilitate the transfer of tokens. See ERC20, BITCOIN WIKI (Oct. 29, 218, 
7:46 AM), https://theethereum.wiki/w/index.php/ERC20_Token_Standard. 
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for a given address. This includes the token script itself, which 
uses balanceOf within the transfer function to check if there is 
sufficient balance available to debit, before subtracting that 
amount from one address and crediting to another. These transfer 
and balance functions are depicted in the graphic below. 
By limiting direct access to the balances, the script functions 
like a metaphorical sealed vault of a novel commodity, with a 
corresponding public ledger determining ownership over the 
contents to different parties. The vault allows users to query and 
alter the ledger only by the mechanisms controlled by a series of 
buttons on the vault’s exterior.  The buttons correspond to the 
functions that a given script makes available, and illustrate how 
even with a transparent vault, control over and ownership of the 
commodity ultimately lies in the mechanism underlying the 
buttons.   Likewise, exchanges of a token can only be effectuated 
through the interface provided by its parent script. In the above 
example this is captured by the “transfer” function. 
While a secondary script may layer on supplementary terms 
of an exchange, the actual transfer of ownership is mediated 
through the script that maintains the balances variable for that 
asset—no matter the rules or rituals one constructs around the 
operation of the aforementioned vault, the ledger remains under 
the sole control of the button mechanisms. Any flaw in the 
mechanism is therefore propagated to all users of the asset. 
Consider what would happen were the coder to forget the 
check ensuring that adequate funds were available. For one, a 
user could transfer more tokens than present in their balance, 
allowing them to accrue more tokens, i.e., cryptoassets, than they 
would otherwise be entitled. Additionally, any other script using 
the asset would also be affected as all token transfers are 
mapping(address => uint256) balances;
function balanceOf(address tokenOwner) public
view returns (uint) {
return balances[tokenOwner ];
}
function transfer(address receiver , uint
numTokens) public returns (bool) {
require(numTokens <= balances[msg.sender ]);
balances[msg.sender] =
balances[msg.sender ].sub(numTokens);
balances[receiver] =
balances[receiver ].add(numTokens);
return true;
}
This variable
matches addresses
to their balance
balanceOf() out-
puts the balance
mapped to an address
transfer() first checks
that the sender’s
balance is su cient.
It then subtracts
tokens from the
sender’s balance and
subsequently credits
them to the receiver’s
Figure 3: Token Script 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523515
31-Jan-20]  Transactional Scripts 28 
 
 
 
	 	 		
mediated by this contract that maintains and controls the balance 
variable. 
Of course, tokens are not merely technological artifacts. They 
take their value from social consensus: their holders must think 
they will eventually provide some utility (even if merely being 
trading instruments). To obtain that consensus, tokens are 
typically described and marketed with natural language text, 
written by people who may, or may not, have coded the tokens’ 
scripts. In previous work, we examined the ERC-20 tokens 
created as a part of initial coin offerings in 2017.117  
Such offerings, loosely modeled on initial public offerings, 
typically involve the exchange of bitcoin or another form or 
cryptocurrency for a set of rights embodied in a transactional 
script. For example, an organization called Kik raised $98M in 
2017 by offering for sale some of 10 trillion “Kin” tokens it had 
created. According to Kik’s White Paper, thirty percent of the 
total sale proceeds were earmarked for “startup resources, 
technology, and consideration in exchange for a covenant to 
integrate with the Kin cryptocurrency and brand.”118 Kik could, 
and did, embed these promises in a transactional script. We found 
that on a variety of measures, Kik’s marketing documents and 
code matched exactly.119  
Tokens—which are already of significant practical import— 
thus pose at least two sorts of problems for jurists. First, what if 
the code itself is somehow flawed, meaning that their buyers 
receive something different than they expected? Second, what if 
the code fails to match the natural language promises that 
purport to describe it?120  
 
B. Exchanges 
 
Sometime on November 15, 2018, someone placed a buy-offer 
for a token called “Free Coin” on the TokenStore decentralized 
cryptocurrency exchange at ten times the prevailing market rate. 
This created a substantial arbitrage opportunity for an 
enterprising trader who subsequently purchased Free Coin at the 
market rate and resold it at the inflated rate, realizing a profit of 	
117 See Cohney et al., supra note 2. 
118 Id. at 628-29. 
119 Id. at 673. That is not to say Kik is in the clear: it remains enmeshed in a fight with the 
SEC about whether its tokens were securities. 
120 See Complaint at 13, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. REcoin Grp. Found., L.L.C., No. 17-CV-
5725 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (alleging securities liability when white paper made 
representations about charitable giving for which “there is no program code”). 
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0.79ETH or $267 USD, while paying a complexity fee of $5.00.121 
Wishing to ensure that the entire sequence of trades was 
completed, the second trader batched the transactions using a 
script guaranteed to complete both the buy and sell trades, or 
neither.  
This series of events is normal on digital marketplaces that 
trade cryptocurrency. Such marketplaces today are a major 
source of liquidity for cryptoassets, and consequently the most 
practically important public face of the transactional script 
commercial ecosystem. 122 Indeed, they may be the only fora where 
it is obvious that transactional scripts are pragmatically 
important mechanisms of exchange. Cryptocurrency exchanges 
take multiple approaches to custody, settlement, and order 
matching, which we now explore. 
Unlike the “Free Coin” trade, the majority of cryptocurrency 
trades currently occur on centralized exchanges. Users send 
either fiat currency or cryptocurrencies to an account controlled 
by the exchange, and in return, the exchange promises to (and 
normally does) promptly transfer an equivalent amount of a 
requested asset. Such trades almost always occur off-chain and 
are settled using the exchange’s internal ledgers.123 Exchanges do 
generally offer custodial “wallets” that store the keys to a users’ 
cryptoassets for easy trading. 
These centralized exchanges could, but in most cases do not, 
use transactional scripts. Rather, they act as market makers, 
facilitating trades between two parties for whom it is the 
custodian. There is thus good reason to assume that trades 
between such parties are governed by ordinary contracts law.  
The trend, however, is towards decentralized models for 
cryptocurrency exchanges.124 Collapses of centralized exchanges 
have left users without access to balances stored on the 
	
121 See Philip Daian, Steven Goldfeder, Tyler Kell, Yunqi Li, Xueyuan Zhao, Iddo Bentov, 
Lorenz Breidenbach & Ari Juels, Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, 
and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges, ARXIV 1904.5234, at 4 (2019), 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.05234. The fee was 113,265 gas at a price of 134 Gwei, or about 
$5. Id. at 5. 
122 See generally Andrea Pinna, Simona Ibba, Gavina Baralla, Roberto Toneli & Michel 
Marchesi, A Massive Analysis of Ethereum Smart Contracts Empirical Study and Code 
Metrics, 7 IEEE ACCESS 78194, (2019), 
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=8733785 (finding that most TS are 
exchanges). 
123 Note these are not ledgers in the blockchain chain but merely the exchanges’ own 
internal record keeping mechanisms. 
124 While trades on decentralized exchanges are still of comparatively low volume, the bulk 
of new exchanges are adopting decentralized models. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523515
31-Jan-20]  Transactional Scripts 30 
 
 
 
	 	 		
exchange.125 Centralized exchanges have also suffered for lack of 
liquidity across rarer asset types as exchanges compete for order 
flow.126 These flaws, combined with the blockchain community’s 
ideological opposition to centralization, provided fertile ground 
for the development of decentralized exchanges127 or DEXes. 
TokenStore, a DEX, did not automatically match trades in 
their order book. Rather, sellers of assets would post an order and 
buyers would digitally sign their intent to match the order, 
forwarding the transaction to the DEX’s on-chain contract which 
provided for a 0.3% payment allotted to TokenStore. This is a 
common setup for DEX systems today.128 The service provided in 
this instance can be viewed as two separable components:129 a 
listing service for open orders, and a platform to automatically 
consummate signed trades. Each component is mediated by a 
different piece of software. The order book is maintained by a 
centralized database, and interaction with it is by a website and 
its accompanying interfaces, both controlled by TokenStore. 
The consummation component is managed by a minimal 
transactional script. To perform a trade, users first place 
cryptoassets in the custody of the transactional script using a 
deposit function. A trader wishing to match an order then uses 
the web interface to generate a signed transaction and submits it 
to the trade() function in the transactional script. The script 
performs a number of checks to ensure that the trade is valid and 
then updates the balances of both users. 
In the case of our poor trader, once the trade was entered into 
the order book, any counterparty could force its execution. 
TokenStore appears to lack either a whitepaper or any 
substantive formalization in natural language of their system 	
125 Mt. Gox., notable for its 2014 collapse, handled as much as 70% of all Bitcoin 
transactions prior to its demise. See Josh Constine, The Plot to Revive Mt. Gox and Repay 
Victims’ Bitcoin, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 6, 2019, 8:00 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2019/02/06/the-plot-to-revive-mt-gox-and-repay-victims-bitcoin/. 
126 See Nathan Sexer, State of Decentralized Exchanges, 2018, CONSENSYS (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://media.consensys.net/state-of-decentralized-exchanges-2018-276dad340c79. 
127 Despite the allure, the term ”decentralized exchange” was long somewhat of a 
misnomer, as earlier generations still relied on a single contract for market making and 
settlement. 
128 An explanation of similar architectures and the costs they impose is provided by Iddo 
Bentov,  Lorenz Breidenbach,  Phil Daian,  Ari Juels,  Yunqi Li & Xueyuan Zhao, The Cost 
of Decentralization in 0x and EtherDelta, HACKING, DISTRIBUTED (Aug. 13, 2017, 1:45 PM), 
http://hackingdistributed.com/2017/08/13/cost-of-decent/.  
129 This separation is justified by noting that a DEX could build a platform compatible with 
a rival’s signed transactions, using its own contract to consummate trades. TokenStore 
itself appears to have added support for transactions originating from “0x”, another 
popular DEX. TokenDev, Posting to Tokenstore/Contract, GITHUB (July 24, 2018), 
https://github.com/tokenstore/contract/pull/11 (announcing an expansion allowing users to 
take 0x orders). 
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architecture. Its website contains no link to a terms and 
conditions, and even their medium blog is sparely populated with 
only eight posts, with fully half being merely launch 
announcements. 
The natural language content surrounding TokenStore is 
limited to a handful of tweets, blog posts, commit messages, and 
code comments, which yield only modest insight into the 
purported offering. A medium post entitled “Advantages of 
token.store ETH — Summarized” touts the security of the 
platform claiming “token.store doesn’t hold any of your funds; the 
trader deposits his funds into a smart contract…This makes the 
experience safe and secure by its very nature” and directs users 
to a link to “check the code”. On Twitter, the project bragged that 
“funds at http://token.store ETH and EOS are held in smart 
contracts: only users who hold the private key to the wallet which 
deposited them can withdraw them.”130 
Of direct relevance to trading error, the code controlling trade 
execution is preceded by the following code comment: 
 
// Note: Order creation happens off-chain but the orders are 
signed by creators, 
// we validate the contents and the creator address in the logic 
below  
 
The notion that TokenStore “validates” the contents of an 
order prior to fulfillment leaves open the question of what 
validation a non-code-reading user ought to expect. We return to 
these issues in Section III. 
 
C. Oracles 
 
In their default setting, transactional scripts are unable to 
interact with events occurring or data outside of the blockchain. 
Consider a transactional script that pays a shipper so long as the 
temperature within the shipping container stays below a certain 
threshold. While the logic is simple (if the temperature never 
went above X, pay the contract price), the quandary for the coder 	
130 token.store (@TokenDotStore), TWITTER (June 22, 2019, 12:32 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TokenDotStore/status/1142470315777363968.  Of note, the script is 
upgradable via an opt-in process, meaning that while TokenStore currently has no way to 
access user assets, a future version of the contract certainly could. Though TokenStore has 
delisted a number of tokens from its order book and user interface, individuals who have 
delisted tokens stored in the transactional script can still access them by manually 
submitting a withdraw transaction to the blockchain. See token.store (@TokenDotStore), 
TWITTER (Nov. 15, 2018, 12:46 PM), 
https://twitter.com/TokenDotStore/status/1063126115290615808. 
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is how to ensure that the transactional script knows what the 
temperature inside the container is. This problem is solved using 
an “oracle,” a computerized agent that periodically submits the 
needed external data to the blockchain to be used within 
contracts.131 
An oracle normally consists of two parts: a script and a way 
to populate the script’s data store.132 The figure below excerpts 
from the oracle for a currency exchange called Synthetix, showing 
a portion of the function that incorporates updates to currency 
exchange rates onto the script’s storage. 
As shown above, to execute the update function, the program 
must provide as input the data it wishes to incorporate. Notably, 
with each update a gas fee must be paid to store the new data. 
Oracles are thus not immune from the challenges associated with 
the complexity tax. 
	
131 Incorporating external data directly onto the chain undermines the consensus 
mechanism as it leaves no principled way for network participants without direct access 
to the external data to validate its correctness. See Alexander Egberts, The Oracle 
Problem: An Analysis of how Blockchain Oracles Undermine the Advantages of 
Decentralized Ledger Systems 5 (Dec. 12, 2017) (unpublished M.A. thesis, EBS University 
of Business and Law) (on file with SSRN), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3382343. 
132 Oracles can exist in software or hardware, with the latter purportedly offering some 
security guarantees stemming from the increased difficulty of compromising hardware 
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The data from oracles is typically provided by a third-party. 
This highlights a significant trade-off: oracles require trust in the 
data source (and further in the soundness of the oracle script).133 
For some, the intermediation and trust reintroduced by oracles 
highlights the “oracle paradox”: the more relevant the oracle data, 
	
133 Federated oracles attempt to tackle this trust problem by distributing it: they require 
that a small number of parties independently provide the same information. The 
transactional script validates that the information it received is consistent across each 
parties’ submission, before it permits the data to be used. Such an approach is no 
guarantee that a series of bugs won’t cause the overall failure of the system. 
function internalUpdateRates(bytes4 []
currencyKeys , uint[] newRates , uint
timeSent) internal returns(bool) {
require(currencyKeys.length ==
newRates.length , "Currency key array
length must match rates array length.");
require(timeSent < (now +
ORACLE_FUTURE_LIMIT), "Time is too far
into the future");
// Loop through each key and perform update.
for (uint i = 0; i < currencyKeys.length;
i++) {
// Should not set any rate to zero ever ,
as no asset will ever be
// truely worthless and still valid. In
this scenario , we should
// delete the rate and remove it from
the system.
require(newRates[i] != 0, "Zero is not a
valid rate , please call delegateRate
instead.");
require(currencyKeys[i] != "sUSD", "Rate
of sUSD cannot be updated , it’s
always UNIT.");
// We should only update the rate if
it’s at least the same age as the
last rate we’ve got.
if (timeSent <
lastRateUpdateTimes[currencyKeys[i]])
{
continue;
}
newRates[i] =
rateOrInverted(currencyKeys[i],
newRates[i]);
// Ok , go ahead with the update.
rates[currencyKeys[i]] = newRates[i];
lastRateUpdateTimes[currencyKeys[i]] =
timeSent;
}
emit RatesUpdated(currencyKeys , newRates);
// Now update our XDR rate.
updateXDRRate(timeSent);
return true;
}
The function takes
as input a set of
exchange rates and
currency pairs, along
with the current time
The function performs
the following process
for each currency pair:
1. Check if the last update was
far enough in the past to
require a new update
2. Invert the rate if required
3. Update the script with the
new rate and reset the up-
date timer
Figure 4: Oracle Script from Synthetix 
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the less one should be willing to trust the provider.134  There are a 
number of ingenious protocol designs that achieve to tweak these 
trade-offs.135 
But oracles break down despite the best intentions of all 
involved. For example, on June 25, 2019, one of the commercial 
data feeds from which Sythnetix receives its USD/KRW (Korean 
Won) exchange rate “began to intermittently report a price 1000x 
higher than the current rate.”136  An earlier outage had taken one 
of the other two data sources offline, and the code to disregard 
outliers averaged the remaining feeds was also buggy. For a script 
operating a market for synthetic cryptoassets tied to real world 
assets, a mismatch between the synthetic asset and the 
underlying asset was the worst-case scenario. 
A bot was able to detect the mismatched exchange rate and 
took advantage of the arbitrage opportunity, acquiring tokens 
with a market value of $1b with a mere $1000 investment.137 
Fortunately for Synthetix, the bot owner reversed the trades in 
return for a bug bounty payout. The chain indicates the reversal 
was achieved through a subsequent trade at an exchange rate 
between an sETH (tokenized ETH) and sKRW (tokenized KRW) 
many orders of magnitude below the actual rate.138 This suggests 
cooperation between Synthetix (which would have been able to 
manually adjust the exchange rate) and the bot owner who 
willingly converted their sETH below market rate. While the on-
chain transactions suggest that the bot owner lost their 
	
134 See Jesus Rodriguez, The Middleman of Trust: The Oracle Paradox and Five Protocols 
that Can Bring External Data into the..., HACKERNOON (July 31, 2018), 
https://hackernoon.com/the-middleman-of-trust-the-oracle-paradox-and-five-protocols-
that-can-bring-external-data-into-the-df39b63e92ae. 
135 Decentralized oracle protocols (such as Chainlink) provide networks of individual 
oracles along with incentive structures that promote trust in the network.  See, e.g., 
Welcome to Chainlink, CHAINLINK DEVELOPERS, https://docs.chain.link/docs (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2020). An alternative solution operated by Augur maintains a prediction market 
which syncs to off-chain events by maintaining a fee pool paid out to participants that 
report on the state of the off-chain world. See JACK PETERSON, JOSEPH KRUG, MICAH 
ZOLTU, AUSTIN WILLIAMS & STEPHANIE ALEXANDER, FORECAST FOUND., AUGUR: A 
DECENTRALIZED ORACLE AND PREDICTION MARKET PLATFORM (2020). Amusingly, a 
participant can disrupt the market by placing a self-referential bet on Augur itself. 
136 Synthetix Response to Oracle Incident, SYNTHETIX (June 25, 2019), 
https://blog.synthetix.io/response-to-oracle-incident/. 
137 The exchange of ETH used to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunity is accessible 
at Transaction Details, ETHERSCAN (June 17, 2019, 9:04 AM), 
https://etherscan.io/tx/0x6f6ee43ee07013503df786532493a3c405465f91e3ce8bb4ba8717a
715db1caa. 
138 This was deduced by following the chain of transactions ending at 
https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc3fc19c63e1090eb624212bad71a27cd3dc7afcd0cf9063d24bfc47b
5d036ae2 with an exchange of 37m sETH for 362 sKRW. Transaction Details, ETHERSCAN 
(June 25, 2019, 2:54 AM). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523515
31-Jan-20]  Transactional Scripts 35 
 
 
 
	 	 		
investment (along with their profits) in the reverse transaction, 
this was likely remediated through a side payout. 
We previously showed a script by which Synthetix  
incorporated various exchange rates. As with our previous 
examples, that script was accompanied by natural language text, 
which provided the opportunity for gaps between intention and 
outcome. The top of the file included the following description of 
its function: 
 
[This is a] contract that any other contract in the 
Synthetix system can query for the current market 
value of various assets, including crypto assets as 
well as various fiat assets. 
 
This contract assumes that rate updates will 
completely update all rates to their current values. 
If a rate shock happens on a single asset, the oracle 
will still push updated rates for all other assets. 
 
Alongside extensive code commentary, Synthetix makes 
representations as to the functionality of its platform in the 
README accompanying the code, in the help section of its 
webpage, and in its marketing materials.139 None of those 
commentary documents references the possibility of an error at 
the data source. The README file, however, notes that the fees 
are governed by an exchange rate that is “derived by looking at a 
basket aggregate of currencies,” that the rates will be not be 
“stale” and that the oracle will be “trusted.” And the MIT License 
for the Synthetix software, which is provided as a file on its 
Github page, states that the software is provided “AS IS.”140 How 
to compile these various statements is the subject of our next 
Section. 
 
III. SCRIPTS AND STACKS 
 
	
139 The webpage does include a link to terms and conditions, but they govern use of the 
website rather than the blockchain platform. Terms of Use, SYNTHETIX, 
https://www.synthetix.io/terms-of-use (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“By accessing the 
website at http://synthetix.io, you are agreeing to be bound by these terms . . . . In no event 
shall Synthetix . . . be liable for any damages . . . arising out of the use or inability to use 
the materials on Synthetix’s website . . . . ”).  
140 MIT License, GITHUB: SYNTHETIX (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://github.com/Synthetixio/synthetix/blob/8f3b95d1205f2b4d6b62124bd07f593773800
743/LICENSE. 
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As we explored above, it simply is not practical to create 
scripts that perfectly embody their coders’ intent. The point is 
generally true for all coded exchange. A 2019 decision issued by 
the Singapore International Commercial Court, applying the 
common law of Singapore (itself derived from English common 
law), offers a unique window into how jurists might resolve the 
contractual consequences of code gone awry.141 
The case involved a lopsided trade of cryptocurrency. Quoine 
operated a centralized currency exchange platform that primarily 
enabled trading of cryptocurrencies. B2C2 was an “electronic 
market marker,” which had developed a trading algorithm 
written by its president several years before the events of the 
case.  In April 2017, Quoine, as it always did, had a program in 
place to monitor users who had borrowed collateral with which to 
trade. When Quoine’s program identified an imbalance in the 
reserves, it forced the sale of collateralized assets at the best 
available price. 
Unfortunately, the program that Quoine had written to 
ensure a liquid market temporarily failed. The result was its 
prices were out of sync with the global market. B2C2, whose goal 
was to capture returns from the bid-ask spread,142 offered to fill 
seven particular orders at a price around 250 times that available 
on the broader market, making it a quick profit of several million 
dollars.143 
The next day, Quoine reversed the trades in its order book. 
B2C2 sued, arguing that the reversal violated Quoine’s terms and 
conditions, which provided that “once an order is filled, you are 
notified via the Platform and such an action is irreversible.”144 
Quoine offered two principal defenses to its supposed 
obligation to complete the trades with B2C2. 
First, it pointed out that its risk disclosure statement, 
uploaded prior to the trade but not expressly incorporated into 
the terms and conditions, permitted a reversal of trades if 
“market circumstances shift dramatically or something else 
happens.”145 The court held that because the statement was not 
expressly incorporated into the contract (that is, into the terms 
and conditions), it did not override the express language of the 
contract itself.146 This decision seems perfectly sensible on its 	
141 B2C2 v. Quoine Pte Ltd, [2019] SGHC (I) 03 (Sing.). 
142 Id. at 5. 
143 Id. at 12. 
144 Id. at 55. 
145 Id. at 64. 
146 Id. at 73. 
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face—an application of the usual idea that an integrated 
agreement ought not be contradicted by extrinsic statements.147 
Second, and more interestingly, the court considered whether 
the facts established a mistake, allegedly because the parties 
would not themselves have executed the trade in a hypothetical 
world where they talked about it in person in real time. That is, 
the parties’ agents—the programs—had executed a deal which, 
though an accurate expression of the code’s instructions, 
somehow failed to capture their “real intent.”148 As Quoine argued, 
the platforms were “really complex platforms”, in which “a lot of 
things [could] go wrong.”149 The mistake in question was not a 
typographical error in the code, but rather an “oversight in the 
design of the system.”150 Quoine asked the court to apply a 
“pragmatic and judicious stance” and void a “clearly erroneous 
trade.”151 
The tribunal, adopting a narrower reading of unilateral 
mistake derived from British common law, held that to avoid 
liability, the person who was not mistaken must have actually 
known of her counterparty’s error and “was shutting her mind to 
the obvious.”152 In deciding whether B2C2 had that requisite state 
of mind, the court noted conceptual difficulties: 
 
“[A]pplying the law to. . . algorithmic trading. . . raise[s] new 
questions. What mistakes have been made and to what 
extent are they fundamental? How does one assess 
knowledge or intention when the whole operation is carried 
out by computers acting as programmed? Whose knowledge 
is relevant? At what date is this knowledge to be assessed?”153 
 
Given that the program executed a fixed trade—i.e., the 
design of the code bespoke the programmer’s intention to strip it 
of any discretion—the court analogized the program to a “mere 
machine carrying out actions which in another age would have 
been carried out by a suitably trained human. [It is] no different 	
147 For this point, the tribunal cited a British treatise and supporting Singaporean 
authorities, but the result would be no different in most US jurisdictions. See id. at 69; 
infra text accompanying notes 225-226. 
148 See generally TIMOTHY MURRAY, ET AL., 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: FORMATION OF 
CONTRACTS § 4.11 (Rev. ed. 2018) (describing old cases on telegraphs and mistakes in 
transmission of messages). 
149 B2C2, 2019 SGHC (I) at 30. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 79. 
152 Id. at 80; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(requiring the non-mistaken party to have ”had reason to know of the mistake . . . ”). 
153 B2C2, 2019 SGHC (I) at 86. 
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[from] . . . a kitchen blender relieving a cook of the manual act of 
mixing ingredients.”154 
The court thus held that for the purposes of ascertaining 
mistake, it would focus on the intent of “the person on whose 
behalf the computer placed the order in question [B2C2].”155 This, 
the court explained, required examining the “state of mind of the 
programmer of the software of that program at the time the 
relevant part of the program was written.”156 Assessing the 
relevant evidence, the court decided that the programmer had not 
inserted code intending to trade at lopsided rates or knowing that 
doing so could only result from the counterparties’ error.  Thus, it 
rejected the claim of mistake. 
Quoine is not a case about a transactional script gone wrong. 
But it does offer a few glimpses into the future of how scripted 
exchanges will be resolved, or at least one possible approach to 
such problems. 
The first is the importance of the role that old-fashioned 
contract law—and old-fashioned contracts—will play in the 
disposition of the parties’ legal rights. The Quoine tribunal 
privileged the natural language contract embodied in the terms 
and conditions over the code. Though it ultimately declared that 
the risk disclosures outside the terms and conditions were not 
binding, it apparently would have enforced those disclosures, had 
they been incorporated, over software code that enabled the trade.  
It was only in the absence of contract terms governing the deal 
that the court turned to what the code permitted, and why.  Thus, 
the coded rules of exchange were, in the court’s view, largely 
irrelevant. 
Second and relatedly, the Quoine court’s focus on the intent 
of the programmer is a natural outgrowth of contract caselaw.  
Interestingly, Quoine focused on intent at the time of the original 
programming. Knowing what B2C2 intended required the court 
only to take the testimony of one coder, and to apply the normal 
judicial tools (assessing demeanor, consistency with prior 
statements and the documentary record) to determine the “truth” 
of the coder’s intent.157 Such a simple story is unlikely to replicate 
when we interrogate more complex coding problems. 
We think that the Quoine decision offers a rough guide to the 
sorts of problems that transactional scripts will raise, and a sense 
of how common law courts will be motivated to resolve them.  	
154 Id. at 89. 
155 Id. at 87-88. 
156 Id. at 89-90. 
157 Id.  
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Indeed, we think the tribunal got it mostly right in context, but 
that its reasons won’t scale. Given what we’ve learned about the 
technological environment generating scripts, we make two basic 
arguments about how the law ought to consider problems related 
to scripting. 
First, judges should not necessarily privilege “contract” over 
“code” but rather ought to ascertain and harmonize meaning 
across a contract stack. Code—when read with its natural 
language comments and commit logs—has communicative 
meaning that courts should seek to ascertain and enforce. Second, 
conditional on integrating the stack, the search for meaning 
should focus on expressions that best reflect the best public-facing 
account of the parties’ shared intent at the time that they 
committed to the deal. We work through these principles by 
suggesting a list of canons of scripted law. 
A. The Canonical Stack 
 
As Jason Allen has recently argued, transactional scripts are 
the latest in a series of “contractware, i.e., technological artefacts 
designed to embody and perform contracts.”158 A chip in a credit 
card embodies the concept well. There is a natural language credit 
agreement between you and your card company, updated and 
modified at the issuers’ will against the background of regulation, 
which define the circumstances under which credit may be 
extended.  Those terms parallel ones agreed to between the issuer 
(or its agents) and merchants, which enable your card (the 
artefact resulting from your natural language agreements) to 
effectuate a pending sale by insertion into the merchant’s reader. 
That is, the card/reader performs contracts that hover in the air 
around them. 
All contractware has this property: it is wrapped within an 
ordinary, legal contract. Absent a legitimate connection to those 
contracts, use of a credit card can still affect the world—your 
account will be debited, the merchant’s credited—but such 
changes can be quickly reversed. Of course, not all contractware 
requires physical manifestations. Allen argues that transactional 
scripts are an example of contractware in which “the subject 
matter of the contract is an immaterial object which can be 
manipulated directly by the [code.]”159 
	
158 Allen, supra note 32, at 5. 
159 Id. at 9. 
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Allen concludes that transactional scripts are layers in the 
“contract stack.”  The stack is a useful metaphor to describe the 
various elements of “contract as a complex entity.”160 A stack 
might include, perhaps, an oral contract (or other indicia of social 
agreement), a written text, and the legal rules which give effect 
to the relationship between the two.  In a transactional script, the 
“written text,” i.e. natural language terms like the statement of 
terms and conditions in Quoine, is “complemented (or supplanted) 
by code which is also, incidentally, wholly or partially executable 
by a machine.”161  Each additional step—the compiling of machine-
readable code from human readable code—adds another layer of 
complexity to the stack, but the stack is intended to operate, and 
therefore ought to be read, as a whole.162 
Many working in this space acknowledge that contract stacks 
will be the mechanism through which commercial projects will 
deliver scripted performance.163 This is the apparent impetus, for 
example, for the International Swaps and Derivative 
Association’s attempt to insert explicit references to scripts which 
operationalize interest payments into the ISDA master 
contract.164 But other sophisticated projects, like the OpenLaw 
cooperative, are explicitly developing stacked deals.165 
But we’d go further. All litigated scripts will exist in contract 
stacks. That’s not to say that there will always be a 100-page 
master agreement, or even clicked-through terms and conditions 
of sale. Rather, our claim is that there will always be some non-
code statements—ranging from the highly formalized terms and 
conditions, to less formalized white papers and code commentary, 
to quite informal promises (twitter)—which will inform tribunals’ 
understandings of what the parties intended to exchange. This is 
true both as a matter of practice, and a matter of logic. Code is 
not self-descriptive. Any scripts that have practical relevance will 
have some non-code language surrounding them. Any set of 
communications relevant to the exchange that are visible to the 
parties are at least presumptively a part of the stack. (Whether 
they all count equally is a harder question.) 	
160 Id. at 18. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 19. 
163 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 32, at 77 (arguing that “hybrid” contracts will be 
useful especially when particular components cannot be reduced to code). 
164 INT’L. SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N., LEGAL GUIDELINES FOR SMART DERIVATIVES 
CONTRACTS: THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMEENT 7 (2019). 
165 See General Questions, OPENLAW, https://app.openlaw.io/faq#first_draft__automate 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (“On OpenLaw, you can execute smart contract code by 
embedding a smart contract call in any template.”) 
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 Thus, although some in the literature have asked if a “smart 
contract” is really a contract, standing alone, we doubt the 
practical relevance of that question. The code standing alone may 
not fully specify an executory contract, unliteral or otherwise, 
because it simply accomplishes performance. But, unlike the 
cheese, at least at the moment, the code never stands alone. As 
our examples in Part II illustrate, it is typically deployed in a 
social context. 
Though the stack is a relatively recent term, the idea that 
transactions are accompanied by many sorts of potentially 
legally-operative promises is not. You buy a car, led to the 
dealership by a commercial, and see a price at the entrance to the 
lot. The dealer makes representations to you. You reply with your 
own admissions. Finally, you sign a written agreement, which 
often seeks to exclude the prior representations as outside of the 
operative deal. The whole exchange is a contract stack. Some of it 
is legally operative, and some is not. When you buy a cup of coffee 
at the store after seeing a sign at the door, the process is the 
same—though if you use an app to fulfill the purchase, some of 
the code that accomplishes payment is obscure to you and is, 
perhaps, not part of the contract. The point is that what counts 
as the “contract” is a post-hoc legal construction, which 
sometimes maps onto a single document, but often does not. 
We thus suggest our first canon—a maxim—to help courts 
make sense of the adjudication of disputes arising from scripted 
exchange. Like all of the rules that we suggest, it builds on 
existing caselaw.  It is also a default rule: the parties can (and as 
we explore below) have changed it by contract. 
 
  
In working through this canon, an example may help. 
Consider a token white paper makes a promise about governance 
rights, but the script contains no reference to that promise.166 That 
was the norm in the 2017 ICO craze. In previous work, we 
conducted an exhaustive audit of the match between semantic 
disclosures (including those in White Papers, Twitter, Instagram, 
Reddit, and Medium) and scripted code in tokens.  We found that 
most programs had not, in fact, created code that conformed to 
their promises.  For over 20% of ICOs in our sample where 	
166 Cf. Cohney et al., supra note 2, at 640-44 (discussing market solutions to missing 
disclosures). 
Canon 1: All shared communications of intent, including the 
code, comprise the legally-operative stack. 
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promoters promised cryptoasset supply restrictions, and 35% of 
promised token burning, we could not observe corresponding 
restrictions written into transactional scripts. Worse, we did not 
find code-based vesting restrictions in twenty-five of the thirty-
six ICOs where promoters promised to adhere to such 
restrictions. Finally, of twelve ICOs for which our audit revealed 
that a central party could modify the functionality of the 
cryptoasset’s code, only four disclosed that ability in their 
promotional materials.167 
To the extent that an action for legal breach of such a contract 
stack is brought, how do we know what was promised? Some 
might argue that the only legally operative promises are those 
made in natural language documents outside of the code; others, 
that the code provides the only relevant set of rules.168 In a way, 
this is quite similar to the start of a conventional parol evidence 
problem where multiple documents are candidates for inclusion 
as the litigated “contract.”169 When the bounds of contract are 
fuzzy—that is, in the absence of integration—the stack of 
contractware is capaciously constructed. This problem is well-
illustrated by the conventional 2-207 problem, where the parties 
have exchanged non-matching forms and the court must compile 
a “contract” ex post.170 
Terms and conditions, because they clearly indicate the 
parties’ intent to contract, are almost certainly part of the stack. 
So too are most published white papers, which make numerous 
promises about what’s to be delivered, even though in some ways 
they are offers directed to the world. The reason is obvious: white 
papers are the best evidence of what the code supplier intends to 
create, and the way that counterparties are enticed to invest, 	
167 Id. at 639-40. 
168 Some have argued that the parol evidence rule would make it difficult “for the parties 
to prove their intent to contract by pointing to other circumstances, such as prior dealings 
or negotiations.” Anna Duke, What Does the CISG Have to Say About Smart Contracts: A 
Legal Analysis, 20 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 141, 159 (2019). This is extremely puzzling, as the rule 
itself only applies to fully integrated agreements. Others suggest that when the parties 
have “signed and verified that the contract had been accurately translated into computer 
code,” it will be difficult for them to later argue that there were additional terms.  Alan 
Cohn, Travis West & Chelsea Parker, Smart After All: Blockchain, Smart Contracts, 
Parametric Insurance, and Smart Energy Grids, 1 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 273, 280 (2017).  
This too is confusing, since the typical way that parties would verify that the contract is 
correct would be to agree to that stipulation in a natural language agreement. 
169 See Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choices, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES IN L. 457, 465 (2019) (“A writing is integrated if and only if the parties together 
intended that it would serve as a final statement of some or all terms of their agreement.”). 
170 See John D. Wladis, The Contract Formation Sections of the Proposed Revisions to 
U.C.C. Article 2, 55 SMU L. REV. 997, 1012 (2001) (“The exchange of non-matching records 
rarely involves parol evidence issues because there is usually no one record that is a final 
expression of the parties' agreement.”)  
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contribute funds, or otherwise transact.171 It might be (as we will 
explore) that terms and conditions provide better evidence of 
intent than do white papers, when both are present, but as a 
starting point, the white paper ought to be considered as part of 
the set. 
More transient promises, like those made on social media 
posts, on reddit, or via video, are also plausible candidates for the 
stack. Jurists will ask if they make promises sufficiently definite 
and certain to enable a fact finder to generate the grist for 
obligation.172 This will turn on the nature of the promises made.173 
Does a post on reddit stating the precise amount of a capped 
supply count?174 We think so. But one that states that “people will 
have an extended period during which they can burn” without 
more detail seems to be too vague to generate obligation.175 
The hardest problem is the contractual status of the script, 
including its commentary. It’s hornbook law that the parties can 
use ciphers to express themselves, and that courts ought to 
enforce such coded meanings “however we may marvel at the 
caprice.”176 In deciding whether to give effect to private meanings, 
courts traditionally engage in a hypothetical inquiry: if the 
parties had been queried at the moment of contracting about the 
meaning of a particular term, what would they have jointly said? 
Courts will thus self-consciously adopt the parties’ expressed 
“vernacular.”177 Unilateral and uncommunicated meaning bear as 
little on the problem of contractual interpretation as the public 
meanings that the parties meant to cast aside.178 	
171 See MURRAY, supra note 150, at § 2.12[1] (describing a “webpage whose contractual 
nature is not obvious” as one where courts will ask if “the recipient actually knows or has 
reason to know of it when she assents to it”).  
172 See id. at § 1.1 (defining an offer “as an act whereby one person gives to another the 
legal power of creation the relation called contract”). 
173 For examples of the sorts of marketing promises made in ICO disclosures, see Cohney 
et al., supra note 2, at Appendix C, https://columbialawreview.org/content/coin-operated-
capitalism-appendix-c/.  
174 See, e.g., helloicon, Posting to r/hellocin, ICON Technical Q&A Summary, REDDIT (Sept. 
18, 2017, 2:06 PM), 
https://www.reddit.com/r/helloicon/comments/70t56h/icon_technical_qa_summary/ 
[ HYPERLINK "http://perma.cc/GXW4-F2K4"http://perma.cc/GXW4-F2K4]. 
175 See Aetrnty, Comment to Burning Token, REDDIT: R/AETERNITY (Sept. 11, 2017, 4:42 
PM), http://www.reddit.com/r/Aeternity/comments/6za07b/burning_token/ 
[https://perma.cc/483H-EQV3]. 
176 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, 24 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS § 
24.9 (Rev. ed. 1998);  Smith v. Wilson (1832) 3 B. & Ad. 728 (KB) (holding that “parol 
evidence was admissible to sh[ow] that... the word thousand, as applied to [the contract], 
denoted twelve hundred”);  Hurst v. W. J. Lake & Co., 16 P.2d 627, 629 (Ore. 1932) 
(holding the term ”minimum 50%” to encompass ”as low as 49.5%”). 
177 KNIFFIN, supra note 178, at § 24.13. 
178 Id. at § 24.6. 
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A traditional requirement about non-traditional 
communications is that the party against whom they would 
operate reasonably understands them to be contractual in 
nature.179 Context matters: the more impermanent the medium, 
the less obvious it should be that a bargain results from the 
posting.180 This is why, in an old case, a court found that the 
language on the back of coat check tickets was unenforceable: 
such scraps “did not arise to the dignity of a contract.”181 Promises 
made in terms and conditions feel like contracts (more or less), 
while those made on Twitter may not.182 
But how about the code? The primary objection to including 
scripts as presumptive source of contractual intent is that the lay 
understanding of code is that it does, it makes no promises to do. 
True, those in the know can learn the coder’s sophistication from 
her script’s elegance and economy, just as connoisseurs of font 
will make inferences based on this Article’s typesetting. But 
that’s not the same as the sort of promissory communication that 
normally generates obligation.   
Moreover, because the code is inherently buggy—as we have 
explored—including it into the stack necessarily means that 
courts are adopting ambiguous evidence of what the parties 
“really” mean to accomplish. Of course, natural language is buggy 
too, as centuries of experiences with contract interpretation 
problems make clear. And the code is festooned with natural 
language comments and commit logs, which do, implicitly or 
explicitly, state what the coders are trying to accomplish. Most 
importantly, in light of the social conventions of the scripting 
industry today, it is reasonable to conclude that participants 
believe that the code-and-comments create obligations, i.e., that 
the script is contractual in nature. The very term “smart 
contracts” justifies this conclusion. The rhetoric of exchanging in 
contracting should be constitutive. 	
179 MURRAY, supra note 150, at § 2.12 [1] (discussing non-contractual documents not 
enforced for lack of inquiry notice). 
180 In some contexts, statements directed at the whole world will be deemed to be 
advertisements.  PETER LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 2.4 (Rev. ed. 2010). But since 
white papers and the like aren’t considered in the abstract here, but rather when 
accompanying the scripts which put them into effect, the better analogy is the 
supermarket circular distributed at the grocery itself. Id. at § 2.7. 
181 Healy v. New York, Cent. & Hudson Riv. R.R. Co., 153 A.D. 516, 519-520 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1912).  
182 See Berkson v. Gogo L.L.C., 9 F. Supp. 3d 359, 382 (2015) (arguing that “[electronic 
contracts] require clearer notice than do traditional retail”). But cf. Kristen Chiger, When 
Tweets Get Real: Applying Traditional Contract Law Theories to the World of Social Media, 
3 ARIZ. ST. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2012) (finding that tweets can create contractual 
obligation).   
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  This conclusion is strengthened in light of our focus on 
public blockchains, where all of the relevant parties have access 
to the scripted rules, can inspect them, and can read the 
associated code commentary. By definition, we have examined 
scripts that are open to bilateral inspection. It would be as if we 
were considering a contract about the importation of chicken from 
abroad, between parties from different countries, that expressly 
incorporated a foreign language dictionary, and then denied that 
dictionary’s relevance in understanding the parties’ meaning. 
Course of performance is typically seen as a strong signal of 
meaning: the script is yet a clearer signal.  It is the expressed 
performance itself, fixed contemporaneously with agreement. (If 
the code were not public, as we’ll discuss below, its relevant to 
discerning the parties’ agreement would be more obscure.) 
Incentives provide a final reason to include code in the stack.  
If lawyers are on notice that the code has legal relevance, that it 
can create or destroy obligation, or help jurists to interpret them, 
they will begin to pay attention. The scripting industry at the 
moment is covered by few specific rules, because of uncertainty 
about the nature of the underlying asset type. Private regulation 
through lawyering—having lawyers work to understand exactly 
what the script says and inquire how it might go wrong—is a way 
to help to civilize this wild west. That is, bringing the script into 
the contract stack will motivate lawyers to care about coding, and 
coders, and consequently reduce the likelihood of promissory 
fraud.183 
 
B. Tensions Within the Stack 
 
What happens if there are differences in what’s promised 
between elements of the stack? Allen argued that questions of 
intent are particularly difficult when interpreting code, as the 
formal language might have meta-logics—internal and 
intentionally chosen goals (like, for example, compactness).184 He 
thus suggests that courts may need to modify traditional canons 
of interpretation to think about how to best capture the parties’ 
meaning when working through layers of a stack.185 He gives no 
further details, and this next part elaborates on the problem. 
	
183 Some may worry that lawyers will seek to clean code of commentary altogether to 
reduce interpretative overhang. But it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to do 
so without leaving inculpatory evidentiary traces. 
184 Allen, supra note 32, at 27. 
185 Id. 
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Courts will often say that interpretation ought to make sense 
of the “contract as a whole,” that is, “the entire deed, and not 
merely upon disjointed parts of it.”186 That’s particularly true 
when the parties express their agreements in multiple 
documents.187 In determining meaning when there is ambiguity, 
extrinsic evidence—that is, anything other than the contract 
itself—is commonly admitted.188 This leads us naturally to a canon 
seeking harmonization. 
 
  
We start by returning to the ICO example.  At least until 
recently, it was common for white papers to make promises about 
governance in ICO “smart contracts,” but neglect to write actual 
scripts containing such coded rules.189 In our view, the stack as a 
whole ought to be read to be making a promise: the absence of 
protection in the code should not be dispositive. If, for example, 
the projects’ founders were to take assets in violation of a textual 
vesting promise, an action ought to lie for breach. That’s true even 
though an informed reader with an understanding of Solidity 
would have readily observed that the tokens contained no 
promises. (Most, in fact, were essentially the unmodified ERC-20 
code.) The point is that a legally informed reader could believe 
those promises to be enforceable based on the white paper alone, 
and their repetition within the script unnecessary. 
Conversely, when the natural language disclosures say 
nothing about the ability to modify rights described as having 
been created in a token, but the script appears to permit 
modification, we might conclude that the contract stack permits 
unilateral changes.190 In the search to understand what the 	
186 KNIFFLIN, supra note 169, at § 24.21 (quoting Blackstone). 
187 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 154, at § 202(2) (“All writings 
that are part of the same transaction are interpreted together.”)  
188 Note that New York courts, like many others in a modern formalist trend, take a 
different approach.  See, e.g., Gilbane Bldg. Co./TDX Constr. Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Mar. 
Ins. Co., 31 N.Y. 3d 131, 137 (N.Y. 2018). 
189 For example, the Monaco project promised that its supply would be capped in a 
transactional script: “The MCO smart contract will stop accepting commitments at 
888,888ETH hard cap.” MONACO, MONACO WHITEPAPER 8 (2018), 
https://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Monaco-MCO-
Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/YXS9-5GQY]. But our audit disclosed no such scripted 
commitment. See Cohney et al., supra2  at Appendix B. 
190 See Cohney et al., supra note 2, at 630-34. Of course, a court could find that, in light of 
an industry-wide practice of describing rights as “immutable,” silence in one layer of the 
stack should be interpreted against a commercial background denying modifiability. Id. 
at 615, n.114. 
Canon 2: Where Possible, Interpret the Stack to Harmonize 
Meaning. 
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contract stack promises, neither code nor script ought to prevail 
over the other, again unless the parties otherwise indicate. The 
goal is to determine what the parties intended, expressed in 
whatever cipher they chose. We should not a priori dismiss rights 
provided in code. 
The TokenStore problem offers another setting for the 
harmonization principle. Recall that TokenStore had a vestigial 
legal wrap in place: a handful of twitter and medium posts, 
making vague gestures about the exchange’s commitment to 
being a hands-off-enterprise. The code permitted trader errors—
indeed, it did nothing to prevent them. However, the code 
commentary stated that “we [i.e., TokenStore’s operators] 
validate the contents and the creator address” of the “orders.” 
It’s not clear what the writers of this comment intended it to 
mean. In programming communities, validate can take on a 
narrow meaning—someone can enter an “input in a form that is 
not expected,” leading in “arbitrary control flow, arbitrary control 
of a resource, or arbitrary code execution.”191 But it can also take 
on a broader meaning, i.e., that the code produces commercially 
reasonable results.192 And perhaps such narrow programming 
meanings are only relevant in commercial markets, so that 
“validate” ought to take on an ordinary meaning, i.e., “to make 
legally valid.” This would mean that the exchange bears the risks 
of obvious errors. Such a reading would be helpful to a trader’s 
action for rescission based on mistake (which will turn in part on 
what the contract says about risk) as well as that for ordinary 
breach of contract. In our view, the correct approach again would 
seek to make sense of the gestalt project, treating the code and its 
natural language comments as guides to parties’ joint intent. 
Harmonization becomes difficult when parts of a contract 
conflict.193 When pieces of a deal counterpose, courts traditionally 
first seek to ascertain the parties’ principal purpose, and then to 
advance it by deciding out which pieces of evidence to privilege. 
For example, handwritten terms prevail over typewritten terms, 
and specially typed provisions control over pre-printed forms.194 	
191 CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATION (Sep. 19, 
2019), https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html. 
192 Data Validation: Business Rules, COMMON OPEN WEB APPLICATION SECURITY PROJECT 
(Jan. 5, 2006) (available at 
https://searchsoftwarequality.techtarget.com/news/1156594/Data-validation-Chapter-12-
OWASP-Guide-to-Building-Secure-Web-Applications-and-Web-Services). 
193 Cf. Surden, supra note 31, at 657 (noting an “unresolved tension . . . in future scenarios 
where there is both a written and data-oriented representation of the same contractual 
expression, with interpretations that differ . . .”). 
194 See generally KNIFFIN, supra note 178, at § 24.23. 
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Courts foreground those provisions that they believe are best 
indicators of what the parties “really” meant. 
Scripted exchange will sometimes also pose problems of 
inconsistent intent. Given that pieces of the stack are written at 
different times, by authors with distinct professional 
backgrounds, and intended for different readers, we should 
anticipate conflicts in meaning.  As a default rule, we’d propose a 
hierarchy of meaning, which privileges natural language 
wrapping text over code when they conflict. 
 
 
By wrapping text, we mean to include any text that is outside 
the code itself, but within the stack. When such text conflicts with 
code, we think the parties’ contract—what they can sue on—most 
likely turns on their natural language expression.195 This is a 
pragmatic choice.196 As with the Quoine tribunal, most judges are 
going to have a natural affinity for text that they can read without 
the aid of an expert translator.197 They will be motivated to believe 
that “no one reads smart contracts.”198 (The fact that no one reads 
regular contracts is equally true, though it feels easier to blame 
them for it.)199 Of course, just like contract text, code can be “read,” 
and often results from a similar iterative drafting process as old-
fashioned contracts. 
Why, then, privilege English over Code? One reason sounds 
in the classic worries about opportunism and bad faith that drives 
many judicial treatments of adhesion contracts. If parties could 
avoid a contractual promise by negating it in code that you had 
no reason to think would be read, we would rightly worry about 
promissory fraud, or other forms of bait-and-switch behavior. 	
195 See Rohr, supra note 32, at 81 ("[C]ode [that automates a larger agreement] is likely to 
be viewed as a component of performance that one party will attempt to prove is 
nonconforming.”) 
196 For a defense of a search-costs based theory of parol evidence and other rules that limit 
“idiosyncratic understandings”, see Joshua Fairfield, The Search Interest in Contract Law, 
92 IOWA L. REV. 1237, 1265-67 (2012). 
197 In consumer-facing transactions, courts also may worry about exploitation when parties 
use language that is hard for adherents to understand.  See, e.g., Frostifresh Corp. v. 
Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759 (Dist. Ct. 1966) (finding that the adherents were 
”handicapped” by contract terms written ”in a language foreign to them”). 
198 Cohney et al., supra note 2, at 598. 
199 See generally Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 (2014). 
Canon 3: In cases of conflict, privilege natural language 
promises over coded ones: i.e., wrapping text, commitment 
messages and code commentary over code, high level code over 
byte code. 
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Though today, many users of transactional scripts are 
sophisticated—even to access scripts, you usually install 
specialized software on your computer—that may not be the case 
going forward. Given that English is easier to read than Solidity, 
and other high-level programming languages, courts will likely 
privilege natural language promises wherever they can. 
But at a deeper level, our intuition is that courts imagine they 
are looking for something they call “real” intent, but which is 
really more like what the parties expressed about their intent to 
the world.200 Just as with other forms of commercial transactions 
drafted and entered in stages, discerning real intent is often a 
fool’s errand.201 That inquiry falsely implies that the parties gave 
the problem some thought. When courts speak about intent, they 
are engaging in a hypothetical and imaginative exercise, which 
entails significant degrees of analytic freedom. But imaginative 
exercises must be explainable in public judicial opinions, and thus 
rely to a degree on text that can be read by the widest audience, 
and which is susceptible to the cheapest judicial oversight.202 
As we’ve shown, code is irreducibly buggy, and the normal 
ways that coders handle error—by iterating better versions—may 
not translate well to scripted exchange. Code simply isn’t a very 
straightforward way to express the parties’ intent. By contrast, 
parties have had hundreds of years of experience contracting in 
English (or French, or Esperanto, turning on the court’s and 
parties’ native tongue). Unless there is good evidence that a 
particular line of code was made salient—for example, if it is 
referred to by line number in the natural language contract 
itself—courts should conclude that text trumps code.203 A 
combination of realism and efficiency, at the end of the day, will 
privilege publicly accessible meaning.204 	
200 See Rohr, supra note 32, at 78.   
201 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: 
A Reassessment of 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1219 (1983); GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF 
CONTRACT 47 (2d ed. 1995) (“[I]f “the actual state of the party’s minds” is relevant, then 
each litigated case must become an extended factual inquiry into what was “intended,” 
“meant,” “believed” and so on.”) 
202 One analogy is the courts’ treatment of disputes about meaning based on differences in 
the parties’ respective native tongues.  In such cases, the courts may adopt the broadest 
and widest-shared meaning available. Frigaliment Importing Co., Ltd. v. B.N.S. Int'l. 
Sales Corp., 190 F.Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).  
203 Rohr points out that courts analyzing vending machine contracts were drawn to 
“meeting of the mind” analogies, even when they plainly were inapt. Rohr, supra note 32, 
at 80. 
204 For a different defense of publicly accessible meaning, see generally Aaron D. Goldstein, 
The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and Contract Interpretation, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73 (2013) (arguing that extrinsic evidence should be limited to public 
and shared meaning to avoid gamesmanship).   
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Whether the text wrapping layer should displace case 
commentary and commit logs is a much harder problem. Here, the 
concerns about publicly accessible meaning drop away, since code 
commentary is generally written in English (or at least a coding 
dialect that can be grokked). The remaining issue is whether 
commentary intending to explain a cipher is as good evidence of 
what the exchange was intended to accomplish as the wrapping 
text’s more legalistic frame. 
On the one hand, the commit logs and commentary is integral 
to the code itself, expressed contemporaneously with its fixation 
and with the goal of revealing its intent.205 It is the “crown jewel” 
of the code, laying bare its “inner secrets.”206 Code commentary 
and commit logs are thus like the definition section of an ordinary 
contract: the very best evidence of meaning.207 Consequently, 
commentary and commit logs should be privileged over the code 
it explains. 
That said, some might worry that code commentary (and, to 
a lesser extent, commit logs) is intended to be disposable208–it 
might signal what a coder hoped to achieve but is not likely to 
have been written with particular care.209 For example, as we 
discussed above, most open source code today is reused from 
script to script. Thus, it’s not necessarily (or even usually) the 
case that the commentary was written with a singular’s project’s 	
205 Daniela Steidl, et al., Quality Analysis of Source Code Comments, in 21 IEEE INT’L. 
CONF. ON PROGRAM COMPREHENSION 83, 83 (2013) (”A significant amount of source code . 
. . consists of comments, which document the implementation and help developers to 
understand the code . . . . Comments are the second most-used documentary artifact for 
code understanding, behind only the code itself.”). 
206 Jeffrey Sullivan & Thomas Morrow, Practicing Reverse Engineering in an Era of 
Growing Constraints Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Other Provisions, 
14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 17 (2003) (“Reverse engineering does not lay bare a program's 
inner secrets. Indeed, it cannot. The inner secrets of a program, the real crown jewels, are 
embodied in the higher levels of abstraction material such as the source code commentary 
and the specification”). 
207 There may be examples where coders make an explicit attempt to synthesize the 
semantic contract within the code.  See, e.g., LEXON, http://demo.lexon.tech/apps/editor/ 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (embedding human readable semantic contract within 
compliable code that exports to Solidity). 
208 Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 DAYTON L. 
REV. 843, 857 (1992) (“[Source code commentary] is the equivalent of marginal annotations 
and is intended to assist the original programmer or those that follow in understanding 
why the program was crafted in a particular way, or to explain a particularly complex flow 
of logic. There are no restrictions on what must or must not be written in comments, but 
inevitably they are the repository of all the knowledge that the programmer has in his or 
her head as the code is being created. One also frequently sees a certain irreverence in the 
commentary which is a by-product of the exuberance of programmers and is best not taken 
too seriously . . . .”). 
209 Cf Haque et al, supra note 51, at 183 (“Another [developer] may constantly contribute 
a high volume of lines over a long period of time, but still be a functionary whose work is 
wholly non-essential and could easily be replaced by others.”) 
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goals in mind. Blindly adopting such commentary as gospel risks 
being misled as to what the parties wanted, just as (for example) 
adopting boilerplate can, over time, lead parties to using terms 
that even they do not understand.210  
Even considering these risks, commentary and commit 
messages should have the same interpretative weight as natural 
language contract terms. True, they might not provide clear 
evidence of promissory intent. But the same objections can be 
made about boilerplate that travels from deal to deal. Moreover, 
though it’s true that some coders treat commentary and logs as 
disposable, well-counseled projects, knowing the rule that we 
propose, would be well-positioned to expand on commentary 
before deploying a script, and impose discipline over commits that 
are merged into the project. The result could be another 
opportunity to surface and correct bugs, while aligning the 
parties’ expectations with what they receive. And, of course, this 
is just a default rule: the parties may express a different rule by 
contracting for it.211 
Finally, we think that the source code generally is a better 
source of meaning than the compiled byte code. That's so because 
the source code is, in broad strokes, readable by humans with the 
exercise of reasonable effort, meaning that all parties to a 
transaction can gain some insight as to what they’ve agreed. The 
alternative, which holds that byte code is the “real” contract, 
seems likely to lead to embarrassing results. For example, 
consider this “online user agreement” which a law student 
confronted: 
	
210 See generally Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert Scott, The Black Hole Project in 
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L. J. 1 (2017) (discussing pari passu clauses). 
211 Cf. Surden, supra note 31, at 652 (describing “data-meaning threshold agreement” to 
give “specific interpretations” for computable contracts). 
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 5 212 
This is not bytecode, but rather an erroneous encoding of the 
bytes into the glyphs that represent them.  Obviously, clicking on 
the agree box wouldn’t bind anyone—the gibberish communicates 
no meaningful information to humans (even if some computer, 
somewhere, could make sense of it).  Byte code is likewise at the 
very bottom of our interpretative hierarchy, as decoding it 
requires the exertion of effort and expertise likely beyond the 
capacity of the contracting parties.  
These interpretive principles ought to give way depending on 
context. Thus, we imagine that ephemeral contractual promises—
a stray tweet by a project manager promising a particular 
outcome of the script—would likely not displace a well-curated 
GitHub repository. Or, a piece of code commentary that makes a 	
212 Samuel P. Morse (@SamuelPMorse), TWITTER (Sept. 13, 2019, 9:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SamuelPMorse/status/1172497664799363075. 
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joke. Here, again, our argument rests on a pragmatic judgment 
as to what courts will do, which in turn relates to the parties’ 
reasonable, commercially-informed expectations.213 The more 
permanent, considered and reliable the evidence of a promise—
the more, in other words, it would be reasonable to rely upon it—
the more a court is likely to consider it a reliable basis of the 
bargain. 
Finally, consider a problem of interpretation that has no easy 
non-scripted analogue. What if the programmers’ intent is 
internally contradictory and is recorded as such. Of course, courts 
will often say that a parties’ private meaning ought to be 
discounted when ascertaining the shared intent of the 
transaction.  Thus, simply because one lawyer on a team thought 
that “black” means “white” doesn’t mean that the term takes on 
that meaning, unless that lawyer communicated her meaning to 
the other side in a way that seemed authoritative.214 This is why 
some have argued that visible metadata ought to bear on 
meaning.215 
Evidence of inconsistent drafter intent in the transactional 
script context is different. Given the use of version control 
systems, both the expression of code and the identity of who wrote 
each line of human-readable code may be knowable at the 
moment the counterparty inspects the terms, and certainly at the 
moment of formation. So is the commentary.  Because the code is 
public, all parties can see the conflicting evidence of meaning at 
the moment the contract is entered: it is like the parties final 
executed document included visible redlined changes.216 Thus, a 
party might encounter a piece of code that has multiple drafters 
who appear to be communicating different goals. What to do in 
this scenario? 
The simplest answer—harmonization with the rest of the 
agreement and with the social context—is probably best. But its 
application is subtle and rooted in the sociology of the operative 
coding community. We ought to prefer (and render operative) the 
meanings of coders who advance the larger agenda of the project, 	
213 MURRAY, supra note 150, at § 4.12 (discussing the role of reasonable interpretations in 
determining meaning). 
214 See Cendant Corp. v. Commonwealth Gen. Corp., No. 98C-10-034 HLA, 2002 WL 
31112430, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002) (holding that the drafting history created 
issue of material fact). 
215 See, e.g. Thomas H. White, Parol Metadata: New Boilerplate Merger Clauses and the 
Admissibility of Metadata under the Parol Evidence Rules, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & 
INTERNET 237, 267 (2012). 
216 For an argument that non-resolved tracked changes ought to be included as part of the 
integrated document, see Elizabeth A. Janicki, Note, Contracts as Speech Acts: Bringing 
Jakobson to the Conversation, 107 GEO. L.J. 201, 218 n.113 (2018). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3523515
31-Jan-20]  Transactional Scripts 54 
 
 
 
	 	 		
to the extent it can be reconstructed.217 Failing that, we should 
prefer later in time to earlier in time pieces of code, and code 
which hews closely to the commentary that surrounds it. These 
match the background rules of contract interpretation, which 
generally seek to find and give priority to the best available 
evidence of the parties’ expressed and integrated intent. 
Overall, this interpretative hierarchy, which promotes 
supervised coding and last-in-time syntax, arises out of the same 
intuitions that generate the parol evidence rule. Recall Corbin’s 
famous, though not universally accepted, rationale for the rule.218 
It was not, he argued, primarily about controlling self-serving 
frauds by excluding convenient ex post evidence of meaning.219 
Rather, the rule was intended to give priority to the parties’ fixed 
agreement: to discard those earlier agreements, negotiations and 
understandings which had not made it into the final and binding 
contract.220 On the question of whether the parties intended a 
particular expression to be the final expression, “no relevant 
evidence, parole or otherwise, is excluded.”221  But even if 
admitted, courts could clearly weigh such evidence and find that 
“the more bizarre and unusual an asserted interpretation is, the 
more convincing must be the testimony that supports it.”222 
On this understanding, if a transactional script’s promotors 
seem to advance multiple potential purposes at odds with one 
another, a court ought to identify those terms that best match the 
reasonable expectations of the parties at the time the moment 
that the counterparty committed to the particular exchange.  The 
existence of prior conflicting terms would still be potentially 
relevant, but they ought to be deemphasized. 
In applying this canon, consider the Synthetix example 
discussed above. One party deployed a bot that took advantage of 
a corrupted third-party oracle to execute a trade which would 
have garnered it potentially a billion dollars in profit. Presumably 
because that amount would have been uncollectable, the hacker 
settled for some undisclosed bug bounty, paid off-chain. Neither 
party tested what contract law would have had to say. But we can 
speculate somewhat as to its contents. 
	
217 See Hunn, supra note 33, at 281. 
218 See generally Arthur L. Corbin, The Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence 
Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 187 (1965). 
219  LINZER, supra note 180 , at § 25.2. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. But cf. Klass, supra note 169, at 464 (describing some theorists’ view that integration 
also controls interpretation evidence). 
222 LINZER, supra note  180, at § 25.2. 
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Canon 1 reminds us to take up all the sources of meaning. A 
license, deployed by Synthetix, disclaimed all warranties as to the 
Code’s correctness. But its commentary promised that the quotes 
were the “current market value.” Thus, if a court were to ask if 
the parties intended this result, the answer would turn, we think, 
on the hierarchy in Canon 3.  In our view, as between two kinds 
of wrapping natural language, the commentary to the code ought 
to take precedence over the ambiguous license, meaning that 
Synthetix would have a difficult time arguing that whatever the 
oracle delivered was, for the parties’ purposes, actionable “market 
values.”  At the very least, Synthetix should have born a heavy 
burden of proving an alternative.223 Thus, Synthetix, which 
presumably would have argued mistake, probably fairly bears the 
burden of a third-party data source risk. 
 
 
We have suggested a set of default rules for interpreting 
scripts. But what if the parties want to vary such rules by 
agreement: should we give these scripted integration clauses 
force?224 Offline, courts have generally permitted integration 
clauses to control which pieces of prior or contemporaneous 
contracting are included within the litigated deal, at least 
between sophisticated firms.225 But courts have sometimes been 
dubious about attempts to integrate fuzzy stacks and to limit 
evidence of meaning that appears otherwise relevant.226 
A problem here is that sophisticated projects will usually 
directly refer to the script in the natural language terms and 
conditions. In such cases, we think it impossible to exclude the 
script entirely—in other words, we don’t think that script can be 
both pointed at and also treated as extrinsic evidence.  That would 
be much like saying that an addendum to a contract, which 
contains a key description of the relevant subject matter, is not a 
part of the deal. 	
223 The case would have been different with an appropriate disclaimer in the terms of use, 
which we have not yet found. 
224 See generally Gregory Klass, Intent to Contract, 95 VA L. REV. 1437, 1442-43 (2009); 
Klass, supra note 169, at 466-71 (discussing when integration clauses are enforceable). 
225 See Klass, supra note 169, at 475-478 (arguing for a “hard express integration rule for 
firm-to-firm negotiated contracts). 
226 Cf. LINZER, supra note 182, at § 25.7 (“[T]he essence of integration is whether they 
intended a document to be the final word, and evidence of this intention should be found 
from all sources, not just the words of the contract.”). 
Canon 4: Where Natural Language Contracts Refer to Code, 
Integration Clauses Should Be Read Narrowly. 
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What parties might do is to try to use the natural language 
contract to determine meaning. Natural language terms and 
conditions would state that the only operative promises are those 
found in the natural language itself, and that parties should not 
read the commentary in the script to make additional or 
contradictory promises about what it accomplishes. This would 
not deny that the code is a part of the bargain, but rather would 
attempt to limit what can be inferred from the natural language 
text it contains.  Or, the converse: that is, the natural language 
may deny its own efficacy and privilege code. 
The choice of whether to defer to such attempts to control 
meaning turns on whether the court generally adopts a more 
contextual or more formalist approach to interpretation.227 
Contextualism, which discourages opportunistic drafting and 
thus protects consumers, has much to commend it in markets 
where sharp dealing is more prevalent. Fraud has defined many 
blockchain products to date, as has incoherent transactional 
lawyering.  This is not a space producing formalism’s best factual 
predicates.  
To the extent these issues seem fanciful, consider the DAO 
hack.228 The DAO was a token-mediated platform that allowed 
small investors to enter jointly into a venture capital pool.229 The 
entity’s “terms,” apart from disclaiming various legal rights, 
stated that the “use of The DAO’s smart contract code . . . carries 
significant financial risk, including using experimental 
software.”230 However, it also stated: 	
227 Compare Wells Fargo Bank v. Cherryland Mall Ltd. P’ship., 812 N.W.2d 799, 810 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 2011) (admitting usage of trade notwithstanding contractual clause that “no trade 
practice . . . shall be used to contradict, vary, supplement or modify any term of this 
guaranty agreement”) with Southern Concrete Servs., Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 
407 F. Supp. 581, 584 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (“The court recognizes that all ambiguity as to the 
applicability of trade usage could be eliminated by a blanket condition that the express 
terms of the contract are in no way to be modified by custom, usage, or prior dealings.”). 
See generally Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2015) ( “The 
enforceability and effectiveness of a general clause opting out of all trade usages is at best 
unclear.”); Joshua M. Silverstein, Contract Interpretation Enforcement Costs: An 
Empirical Study of Textualism versus Contextualism Conducted Via the West Key Number 
System, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1011 (2019). 
228 See, e.g., Haque et al, supra at 51, at 167-71; Laila Metjahic, Deconstructing the DAO: 
The Need for Legal Recognition and the Application of Securities Laws to Decentralized 
Organizations, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1533 (2018) (analyzing the corporate legal theories 
under which the creators of The DAO might be held liable for the 2016 hack). 
229 See Vitalik Buterin, Bootstrapping a Decentralized Autonomous Corporation: Part I, 
BITCOIN MAG. (Sept. 20, 2013), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/bootstrapping-a-
decentralized-autonomous-corporation-part-i-1379644274. 
230 Explanation of Terms and Disclaimer, DAOHUB, https://daohub.org/explainer.html, 
archived at INTERNET ARCHIVE,   
https://web.archive.org/web/20160704190119/https://daohub.org/explainer.html (captured 
on July 4, 2016) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). 
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The code repository contained an even more incoherent set of 
disclaimers, including a readme file that claimed that using the 
software “does not, in and of itself, create a legally binding 
contract,” and that “in order for you to form a legally binding 
contract you shall seek legal advice from an appropriately 
qualified and experienced lawyer.”231 This set of disclaimers 
appears to be an attempt to shield the entity from liability by at 
once embracing and rejecting contract law.232 
After users had contributed funds, but before the DAO’s own 
investments had begun, someone noticed a flaw in its code which 
allowed siphoning of $55 million (of around $170 million total 
assets) out of the pool. Ethereum’s then developers promulgated 
a proposed software update to the entire blockchain – a hard fork 
– which was adopted by some, but not all, holders of the original 
tokens.233 
The DAO’s creators had some warning of the vulnerability.234  
Before the hack, a commentator posted about the vulnerability 
(titled, “Protect against recursive withdrawRewardFor attack”) 
and suggested a seemingly easy change (reversing the ordering of 	
231 Stephan Tual, Posting to slockit/DAO, Updated Readme, GITHUB (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://github.com/slockit/DAO/commit/aceec3efcc8afd4277396ebc42628f2e5ca8dff2#diff-
04c6e90faac2675aa89e2176d2eec7d8.  
232 For a trenchant analysis of these issues, see Drew Hinkes, A Legal Analysis of the DAO 
Exploit and Possible Investor Rights, BITCOIN MAG. (June 21, 2016). 
233 Reyes, supra note 29, at 388; The Ethereum Classic Declaration of Independence, 
ETHEREUM CLASSIC (Aug. 11, 2016), 
https://ethereumclassic.org/assets/ETC_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf (declaring the 
holders’ intent to  ”continue the original Ethereum blockchain” and decrying the hard fork 
as a violation of the blockchain’s ”core tenets”). 
234   See,  e.g.,   Matthew   Leising,   The   Ether   Thief, BLOOMBERG (June   13,   2017),   
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-the-ether-thief (”Gün . . . had already been 
tracking and publicizing flaws in the DAO’s design. . . [He] appears to be the first to 
pinpoint the flaw that put the money in jeopardy.”). 
Figure 6: The DAO's Terms 
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two lines of code) which would close it.235 The DAO made the 
change, reassuring users that “The important takeaway from this 
is . . . this is NOT an issue that is putting any DAO funds at risk 
today.”236 The updated version was called The DAO 1.1 
“milestone.” In the code, the in-line comment preceding the new 
revision on line 580 stated its explicit purpose:237  
// we are setting this here before the CALL() 
value transfer to 
// assure that in the case of a malicious 
recipient contract trying 
// to call executeProposal() recursively money 
can't be transferred 
// multiple times out of the DAO 
 
Assurance notwithstanding, someone then executed the 
famous hack—in part because The DAO’s fix was incomplete—
transferring money multiple times out of The DAO. 
Thus, here we again have a stack of meaning about what the 
parties to the contract—The DAO’s creators and its investors—
expected.238 But the relevant documents are contradictory. The 
actual code did not accomplish what the comment or white paper 
promised, a fact that soon became obvious to all. Moreover, the 
organizers of The DAO had specifically told users that the code 
governed, even as they disclaimed the legal enforceability in the 
code itself.239 Let’s use the canons to offer a solution to the private 
law contracting problems that the DAO occasioned. 
As Canon 1 instructs, we ought to consider all the relevant 
pieces as evidence of meaning, and of what was promised. The 
code, terms and conditions and readme files all are a part of the 
stack. 	
235 LefterisJP, Posting to Slockit/DAO, GITHUB (June 12, 2016), 
https://github.com/slockit/DAO/commit/f01f3bd8df5e1e222dde625118b7e0f2bfe5b680?diff
=split. 
236 Stephen Tual, No DAO Funds at Risk Following the Ethereum Smart Contract 
’Recursive Call’ Bug Discovery, SLOCK.IT (June 12, 2016), https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-
funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smart-contract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-
29f482d348b. 
237LefterisJP, supra note 219, at line 580, 
https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/d48ee5c49f9dc3b9548623aa6985cbc3c9528b67/DAO.
sol#L580. 
238 Stephen Tual, credited as a primary organizer, said: “No one benefits from it except the 
people that support it. Even we, the ones who invented it, get nothing.” Tanaya Macheel, 
The DAO Might Be Groundbreaking, But Is It Legal?, AM. BANKER (May 19, 2016, 3:12 
PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-dao-might-be-groundbreaking-but-is-it-
legal. 
239 See generally Kolber, supra note 24, at 218, 221 (“Note:  Although  the  word  “contract”  
is  used  in  The  DAO’s code, the term is a programming convention and is not being used 
as a legal term of art.”). 
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Canon 2 suggests that the DAO’s counterparties reasonably 
could have believed that they would not face the risk of recursive 
money transfer.240 That promise, embodied in a marketing 
announcement and in the code comments itself, is, it is true, 
absent in the operational code. It’s as if a door which contained on 
its front face a sign stating “Private Property: Locked Door” was 
freely openable with a key hanging nearby. If someone were to 
have been harmed by relying on that set of statements, when 
suing in fraud or tort they would face questions about how 
reasonable their precautions had been.241 But in a contract 
lawsuit, Canon 3 teaches that code should bow to comments and 
commit logs in a way that best embodies what the programmers 
intended to accomplish and therefore to what they ought to be 
held.242 Canon 4 tells us to discount the attempts at non-
integration as, at best, confused. 
We thus disagree with The DAO’s attacker, who argued that 
the fork violated its rights because those actions were literally 
permitted by the code.243 Yes, code drafters ought to bear the 
interpretative risk of error.244 But the non-drafting counterparties 
whose funds were taken could not reasonably be expected to know 
that the code had that bug, given the commentary promising the 
opposite result. Had they not received their money back, The 
DAO’s investors should have been able to bring an action for 
breach against its developers, or even, perhaps, against the 
attacker if its action amounted to participating in the nexus of 
contracts that The DAO had proposed.245 	
240 Rohr, supra note 32, at 85 arrives at a similar conclusion, noting analogies to vending 
machine cases to find that “the agreement includes only those terms that were reasonably 
available to DAO Token holders prior to purchase,” which Rohr impliedly concludes would 
include the Terms of Use but not the permissive code. 
241 One problem we leave to future work is the relationship between putting statements 
inside the contractual stack and the tort-contract line in litigation. 
242 Thus, we reject the idea that the only operative promises are those written in code. Cf. 
Larry Lessig, Code    Is    Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2000, 
https://harvardmagazine.com/2000/01/code-is-law-html. 
243 A Guest, An Open Letter, PASTEBIN (June 18, 2016, 5:21 AM), 
https://pastebin.com/CcGUBgDG (claiming that the fork “would amount to seizure of my 
legitimate and rightful ether,  claimed  legally  through  the  terms  of  a  smart  contract.”). 
244 In this context, perhaps all participants, including investors and programmers, could 
be considered simply partners. See Steven Palley, How to Sue a Decentralized Autonomous 
Organization, COINDESK (Mar. 20, 2016, 3:17 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/how-to-sue-
a-decentralized-autonomous-organization/. In that event, agency law would presumably 
add complexity to the interpretative defaults. 
245 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81,207, at 7-8 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf (suggesting curators faced 
potential liability); Drew Hinkes, A Legal Analysis of the DAO Exploit  and  Possible  
Investor  Rights,  BITCOIN MAG. (June 21, 2016), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/a-
legal-analysis-of-the-dao-exploit-and-possible-investor-rights-1466524659. 
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C. Recapitulating the Canons: Quoine and Non-Public 
Scripts 
 
We have confined our analysis to the definition of 
transactional scripts we offered in the introduction. Such scripts 
present a relatively tractable set of problems for contract jurists. 
Because the scripts are public, and participants typically are 
knowingly participating in a specialized form of commerce, the 
sorts of concerns we might have about knowledge, opportunism, 
and black-box contracts are, by and large, muted.246  
How to apply the canons when parties are not sophisticated 
and cannot easily parse the code at the moment of the exchange, 
presents a distinct and difficult set of questions. In the Quoine 
case, for example, it is not obvious that either side had easy access 
to each other’s code. Where parties cannot access code, it can’t 
communicate meaning, no matter how well drafted its 
commentary. Thus, it can’t be part of the stack that comprised the 
grist for the bargain.  
But what happens when non-programming parties can access 
the code but there is no social expectation that it expresses the 
intent to contract: that is, what about “smart contracts” with 
transparent code, but involving ordinary consumers who might 
not even be aware that their contract’s execution occurs 
automatically? When natural language promising conflicts with 
coded rules, should we read them together? One possibility is that 
Canon 3, which treats natural language describing and 
commenting on code as on the same level as contract terms 
themselves, might need recalibration. Or it might not. Because 
ordinary contract terms themselves are typically unread, more 
work is necessary to consider which sorts of buried terms count 
in making bargains. We leave these problems to future work. 
 
IV.  THE FUTURE OF THE CONTRACT STACK 
 
To date transactional scripts haven’t delivered revolutionary 
change to either the world or our small, legal, corner of it. In the 
big picture, the ecosystem is marginal: billions of dollars of 
investment in a trillion-dollar world economy. And yet the 
intellectual footings of the script project are expanding at an 
astounding rate. Every day, new projects (like Facebook’s Libra, 	
246 In a forthcoming paper, Greg Klass discusses these issues in depth. See Greg Klass, 
How to Interpret a Vending Machine (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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or JP Morgan’s fiat coin) launch with scripted roots, and the 
technical community gains experience and competence with each 
failure. We simply have no idea what the future of coded exchange 
will look like.247 
The relationship between this burgeoning, but still highly 
speculative, ecosystem and law are typically described as 
antagonistic. Thus, for noted commentator Nick Szabo, the 
primary virtue of “smart contracts” is that they ostensibly don’t 
need law.248  For others, scripted deals “will subject the provision 
to justice to market forces and break the state’s monopoly over 
the court system.”249 This is an ideological call to arms against the 
civilizing and constraining role that contract jurists have 
traditionally had in commercial life. 
Our approach is different. First, unlike some skeptics, who 
think that transactional scripts are toys with no real use cases, 
we believe that they are a potentially valuable new contracting 
technology. It might be that scripts will reduce back-end 
transactional costs by reducing the need for transactional 
lawyering.250 In certain settings, the benefits from cutting 
enforcement costs will be worth the costs of upfront 
specification.251 By reducing monitoring costs on the margin, 
transactional scripts may make it more likely for parties to enter 
into the exchange. Similarly, in regimes where institutional trust 
is at a nadir and centralized trading repositories are unreliable, 
scripts can provide significant value.252 
And yet, this value will have natural limits, defined by a 
tradeoff between the value of trustless computing and the added 
costs imposed by the complexity tax, whose scope we are the first 
to make concrete. Most solutions to the complexity tax require 	
247 See generally Allen, supra note 32, at 11 (warning against too heavily discounting the 
likelihood of successful deployment). 
248 See, e.g., Nick Szabo (@NickSzabo4), TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2018, 6:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/NickSzabo4/status/1051606530108190720 ("Worrying about whether a 
smart contract is "legally enforceable" reflects a profound misunderstanding. The main 
relation of smart Ks to traditional courts is that smart Ks control burden of lawsuit.”); 
Nick Szabo (@NickSzabo4) TWITTER (Oct. 14, 2018) (deleted), available at 
https://medium.com/cryptolawreview/whys-szabo-afraid-of-smart-contract-critiques-
669ef9e63fc0 ("The parties can if they choose write a traditional K to backstop a smart K, 
although in many situations where a smart contract is useful the exercise would be 
pointless....”). 
249 Raskin, supra note 26, at 335. 
250 See Sklaroff, supra note 17, at 275-77 (noting that transactional scripts can reduce 
accounting, due diligence, monitoring, and enforcement costs); Werbach & Cornell, supra 
note 22, at 322, 348 (noting that the ability of transactional scripts to automatically verify, 
facilitate, and remedy). 
251 Cf. Sklaroff, supra note 17. 
252 See generally Eric Tai, Force Majeure and Excuses in Smart Contracts, 26 EUR. REV. 
PRIV. L. 787, 787 (2018). 
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either the intermediation of third parties or consensus protocols 
running across a smaller set of validators.253 Thus, at least for 
now, complex organizational solutions will remain within “real” 
contracts, while particular, discrete, computable aspects can be 
put on public blockchains. This conclusion fits well with the most 
sophisticated guidance currently available.254  
The future of scripts is thus about hybrids, where code and 
natural language must work together. At the bottom, legal 
scholarship about computable contracts simply hasn’t fully 
grappled with the irreducibly buggy nature of coding. Errors in 
coded exchange will result in the parties’ outcomes stubbornly 
failing to match their goals. In our view, the persistence of error, 
and the hazards of determining intent, makes recourse to third-
party decisionmakers inevitable. Transactional scripts are not, 
and will not be, self-executing, at least not all the time. At that 
point, such decisionmakers will be well-advised to look at 
traditional contract principles to help resolve disputes. 
Our approach would bring scripts within the traditional 
world of contract law through a constitutive legal act: the 
compilation of a contract stack. This solution is not merely useful 
for the current form of transactional script. It has relevance for 
other sorts of digital and algorithmic contracting, whether now 
contemplated or yet to be imagined. Code can communicate 
executory intent to contract and can thus be the grist for legal 
analysis. But, because it is imperfect, code-mediated transactions 
will sometimes fail to achieve what their promisors intend, even 
as they are surrounded by communications in “real” languages, 
intended to be relied on by real people. In such cases, law will 
confront—and must surmount—two temptations: ignoring the 
code altogether as a mere instrument of performance, or enforcing 
it as an exculpatory clause written in ciphered text. We’ve already 
seen advocates within the blockchain space make both 
arguments. 
We argue for an alternative approach, which first claims 
transactional code, commentary and logs as a part of the 
contractual stack, capable of expressing meaning about the 
parties’ intent. We’ve also defined a hierarchy of meaning that 
situates natural language disclosures above artificial ones. The 	
253 Other partial solutions to the complexity tax involve more exotic forms of cryptographic 
proofs (such as Proof-of-Retrievability for storage) that can reduce redundancy and thus 
costs. See, e.g., Andrew Miller, Ari Juels, Elaine Shi, Bryan Parno & Jonathan Katz, 
Permacoin: Repurposing Bitcoin Work for Data Preservation, 24 PROCS. IEEE SYMPOSIUM 
ON SECURITY & PRIVACY (2014). The ultimate efficacy and commercial adoption of such 
schemes remains an open question. 
254 Cf. INT’L. SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASS’N., supra note 164. 
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canons we’ve proposed, built on an informed understanding of the 
coding ecosystem, predictably enforce the parties’ reasonable, 
publicly communicated, intent, and will forbid opportunistic 
exploitation of subtle errors in coding. These ought to be the law’s 
goals in compiling contracts executed on blockchains, as well as 
whatever forms of coded exchanges the future delivers to us.  
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